THE BANNER OF THE 13TH GUARDS RIFLE DIVISION.
The above images were kindly presented by members of "Club Patriot", Moscow to members of the 13th Guards "Poltavaskaya" Rifle Division, United Kingdom, at a meeting on 25th April 2015 in Torgau, Germany to commemorate "Elbe Day", the meeting of the Allied and Soviet Forces on the River Elbe in April 1945.
The original Banner is stored within the Central Army Museum in Moscow. Special permission was granted by the museum for the Banner to be photographed on our clubs behalf. We sincerely extend our appreciation to the Directors of the museum for the granting of such permission.
The above images were kindly presented by members of "Club Patriot", Moscow to members of the 13th Guards "Poltavaskaya" Rifle Division, United Kingdom, at a meeting on 25th April 2015 in Torgau, Germany to commemorate "Elbe Day", the meeting of the Allied and Soviet Forces on the River Elbe in April 1945.
The original Banner is stored within the Central Army Museum in Moscow. Special permission was granted by the museum for the Banner to be photographed on our clubs behalf. We sincerely extend our appreciation to the Directors of the museum for the granting of such permission.
A post war commemorative photomontage showing veterans of the 13th Guards Rifle Division and the combat route of the Division during the Great Patriotic War 1941-45. Stalingrad is just in view at the far right of the image and depicted by the "Rodina Mat Soviet" statue, in modern day Volgograd. The statue was completed in 1967, therefore the image is post that date.
General Rodimtsev is situated at the front centrally,above left of the Order of the Great Patriotic War,wearing a military uniform and bearing his many awards.
The 13th Guards Rifle "Poltavaskaya" bearing the Order of Lenin, twice Order of the Red Banner, Orders of Suvorov and Kutuzov Division.
The 13th Guards was a Red Army Rifle unit which had a distinguished combat record during The Great Patriotic War 1941-45. It also saw service during the invasion of Poland in 1939 and the "Winter War" 1939-40 with Finland. From the first hours of the Axis invasion of the Soviet Union in June 1941 the Division took part in operations from the border battles of the Ukraine, battles for Kiev, Kharkov(2nd), Stalingrad, Kursk, Dnepr operations,the battles for Kharkov(4th), Poltava,the liberation of western Ukraine, Moldova, Lower Silesia Poland,the southern Berlin operations near Torgau, the capture of Dresden and finally, the liberation of Prague operations in the very last hours of the war in Europe in May 1945.
The above orders would have each adorned their respective coloured tasseled streamers and were borne on the Divisional Guards Red Banner on formal parades i.e. as seen in some of the images of the Victory Parade on Red Square in our Gallery pages.
Post war, on 1st November 1945 the Division was re organised as the 13th Guards Mechanised Division, part of the Soviet Southern Group of Forces (SSGoF) and retained the wartime honorific awards and title Poltava. From 23rd April 1946 the 13th Guards Mechanised Division was stationed in Vienna, Austria until the establishment of the Austrian State Treaty of 27th July 1955. Following the ensuing Soviet withdrawal from Austria, the unit was subsequently disbanded. The Divisions lineage was carried on as the 13th Guards Tank Division (SSGoF) and other sub units during much of the Cold War period, stationed in Hungary and thereafter Crimea, Odessa Military District (OMD) respectively, before it was finally disbanded in December 1989.
The above orders would have each adorned their respective coloured tasseled streamers and were borne on the Divisional Guards Red Banner on formal parades i.e. as seen in some of the images of the Victory Parade on Red Square in our Gallery pages.
Post war, on 1st November 1945 the Division was re organised as the 13th Guards Mechanised Division, part of the Soviet Southern Group of Forces (SSGoF) and retained the wartime honorific awards and title Poltava. From 23rd April 1946 the 13th Guards Mechanised Division was stationed in Vienna, Austria until the establishment of the Austrian State Treaty of 27th July 1955. Following the ensuing Soviet withdrawal from Austria, the unit was subsequently disbanded. The Divisions lineage was carried on as the 13th Guards Tank Division (SSGoF) and other sub units during much of the Cold War period, stationed in Hungary and thereafter Crimea, Odessa Military District (OMD) respectively, before it was finally disbanded in December 1989.
History of the 13th Guards Rifle Division.
The Early years.
Prior to receiving Guards status in 1942, the 13th Guards was formerly the 87th Rifle Division, whose lineage date to 1929. The Division in formation at the start of the war was raised during early 1936 as part of the Kiev Military District in the Korosten Fortified Area and was based in the Belokorovichi area. In September 1939, it took part in the annexation of Western Ukraine and invasion of Poland.
The 87th Rifle Division (first wartime formation) was commanded as follows during the early years of the war: -
1941 Maj. General F.F Alyabushev.(KIA 25.6.41)
1941 Col. A.I Rodimtsev.(later Gen.Major Commander 13th Guards)
The subordinate units within the 87th Rifle Division 1941 formation were as follows:
Prior to receiving Guards status in 1942, the 13th Guards was formerly the 87th Rifle Division, whose lineage date to 1929. The Division in formation at the start of the war was raised during early 1936 as part of the Kiev Military District in the Korosten Fortified Area and was based in the Belokorovichi area. In September 1939, it took part in the annexation of Western Ukraine and invasion of Poland.
The 87th Rifle Division (first wartime formation) was commanded as follows during the early years of the war: -
1941 Maj. General F.F Alyabushev.(KIA 25.6.41)
1941 Col. A.I Rodimtsev.(later Gen.Major Commander 13th Guards)
The subordinate units within the 87th Rifle Division 1941 formation were as follows:
- 16th Rifle Regiment
- 96th Rifle Regiment
- 283rd Rifle Regiment
- 197th Artillery Regiment
- 212th Howitzer Artillery Regiment
- 85th Separate Anti-Tank Artillery Battalion
- 14th Separate Anti-Aircraft Artillery Battalion
- 43rd Reconnaissance Battalion
- 11th Sapper Battalion
- 14th Separate Communications Battalion
- 59th Medical-Sanitary Battalion
- 119th Separate Chemical Defense Company
- 86th Auto Transport Company
- 137th Field Bakery
- 403rd Field Cash Office
1939-40.
Poland.
German and Soviet troops greet each other in Poland.
Invasion of Poland.
On 23rd August 1939 in Moscow, less than two weeks before the outbreak of war, Hitler's deputy, von Ribbentrop met with the Soviet foreign minister Molotov and signed the Non Aggression Pact. Both countries agreed to remain neutral in the event either country was invaded by a third party. They also agreed a secret protocol where both countries would divide up Northern and Eastern Europe into German and Soviet areas of influence, which included Poland. The Soviets subsequently occupied the Baltic States, Western Ukraine and Bessarabia, which was part of Romania.
The Soviets also supplied Germany with oil, minerals, chromium, wheat, grain and a vast array of other war materiel, which was used by the Germans for the invasion of Western Europe.Stalin had entered into the pact in the belief it would buy the Soviets vital time in which to build up the Red Army for the inevitable war with Germany.
The Division in Poland.
Following Germany's invasion of Poland on 1st September 1939, on the 17th September the Soviet Union invaded eastern Poland, under the secret protocols of the German-Soviet Non Aggression Pact. The Division as part of the Ukrainian Front, 5th Army, 15th Rifle Corps between 17th September to 2nd October were located in the area of Rovne and Kostopol where it made its first engagement with 3rd Regiment Polish KOP (Border Defence Corps) on the 19th. On the 21st September the 16th Rifle Regiment of the Division took part in the Battle of Borowicze-Nawóz-Huziaty.
On 22-23rd September the entire Division took part in the Battle of Janówka and Stochów and the Battle of Szack on the 28th September and the Battle of Wytyczno on 1st October respectively. The 15th Rifle Corps also took the town of Kowel on 21st September and crossed the River Bug and took Chelm on 25th September. During the Polish campaign, the Division reported 99 killed and some 137 wounded in action and took around 1500 Polish prisoners of war. However, these figures are believed to be somewhat lower for propaganda purposes, as the battles at Szack and Wytyczno were the two greatest Soviet defeats of the Polish Campaign!
On 23rd August 1939 in Moscow, less than two weeks before the outbreak of war, Hitler's deputy, von Ribbentrop met with the Soviet foreign minister Molotov and signed the Non Aggression Pact. Both countries agreed to remain neutral in the event either country was invaded by a third party. They also agreed a secret protocol where both countries would divide up Northern and Eastern Europe into German and Soviet areas of influence, which included Poland. The Soviets subsequently occupied the Baltic States, Western Ukraine and Bessarabia, which was part of Romania.
The Soviets also supplied Germany with oil, minerals, chromium, wheat, grain and a vast array of other war materiel, which was used by the Germans for the invasion of Western Europe.Stalin had entered into the pact in the belief it would buy the Soviets vital time in which to build up the Red Army for the inevitable war with Germany.
The Division in Poland.
Following Germany's invasion of Poland on 1st September 1939, on the 17th September the Soviet Union invaded eastern Poland, under the secret protocols of the German-Soviet Non Aggression Pact. The Division as part of the Ukrainian Front, 5th Army, 15th Rifle Corps between 17th September to 2nd October were located in the area of Rovne and Kostopol where it made its first engagement with 3rd Regiment Polish KOP (Border Defence Corps) on the 19th. On the 21st September the 16th Rifle Regiment of the Division took part in the Battle of Borowicze-Nawóz-Huziaty.
On 22-23rd September the entire Division took part in the Battle of Janówka and Stochów and the Battle of Szack on the 28th September and the Battle of Wytyczno on 1st October respectively. The 15th Rifle Corps also took the town of Kowel on 21st September and crossed the River Bug and took Chelm on 25th September. During the Polish campaign, the Division reported 99 killed and some 137 wounded in action and took around 1500 Polish prisoners of war. However, these figures are believed to be somewhat lower for propaganda purposes, as the battles at Szack and Wytyczno were the two greatest Soviet defeats of the Polish Campaign!
Finland.
The Winter War.
Soviet troops examine a captured Finnish flag.
The Winter War 30/11/39 - 13/3/40.
Finland was formerly part of the Russian Empire until it's independence in 1917. During the 1920's and early 1930's it was a politically unstable time between the two countries, in particular relating to land disputes. Finland's borders had been moved close to the former Bolshevik capital of Leningrad (modern day St. Petersburg) following its independence.
The Soviets wanted the Finns to move their border north and westwards to create a larger buffer zone between Leningrad and for cessation of land in the Karelian Isthmus and islands in the Gulf of Finland. In return the Soviets would also cede land, however the Finns would have to dismantle their defences in Karelia. The offer was rejected by the Finns at the end of October 1939.
On the 26th November the Soviets deliberately orchestrated a "border incident", which prompted the invasion of Finland in retaliation. The Finns had a relatively small army with few tanks and ammunition and supplies calculated to last up to sixty days, concentrated their main defences on the Mannerheim Line in the Karelian Isthmus.
The Soviets fielded over 1 million men in various military capacities during the whole conflict. However, they were very ill prepared to conduct a winter campaign and were poorly led by their field commanders.
The Finnish terrain was not suited to a mobile war with few passable roads and was thickly forested with numerous lakes and swamps. Also, the winter of 1939-40 was extremely cold with temperatures in the region dropping to record lows of minus 43 degrees centigrade. During the first two months of the conflict the Finns inflicted several defeats, in particular using their ski troops tactics to good effect in ambush operations against the slow lumbering Soviet forces.
It was not until early February 1940 with the appointment of Marshal Timoshenko as commander, combined with massive build up Soviet forces, tanks and artillery and changes in their tactics, that the Soviets were able to make headway against the Finns, who were rapidly becoming unable to sustain the war and were approaching exhaustion. Finland sued for peace and the Soviets, who suffered embarrassingly high casualties and who were also concerned by the prospect of international military intervention by Britain and France, duly entered into negotiations with the Finns. However, both Norway and Sweden subsequently would not allow a right of passage through their respective countries to an international army to come to the aid of the Finns. So, in March 1940 suffering high casualties and near exhaustion the Finns were therefore forced to accept the Soviet peace terms.
The Division in Finland.
On the 11th February 1940 the Soviets launched a new massive offensive against the Finns
On the 12th February 87th Rifle Division (Kiev Military District) and 128th Motorised Rifle Division (Ural Military District) were mobilised as the 14th Rifle Corps, one of many new formations additionally deployed during the course of the war. The 14th Rifle Corps were to reinforce the previously badly depleted Soviet 8th Army, which was stationed north of Lake Ladoga. On the 9th March the Division was structured within the 8th Army and elements of the Division, namely the 16th and 293rd Rifle Regiments and 212the Howitzer Regiment were deployed on the 11th March within the centre of the 1st Rifle Corps sphere of operations and saw action in the continued new offensives to breach the flanks of the Mannerheim Line in Karelia in the closing days of the war. On 12th March 1940 following peace negotiations the Treaty of Moscow was signed in Moscow. Firing ceased at 2300hrs the following day on all fronts and troops began to withdraw to the new agreed national borders, Finland having ceded 11% of its territories to the Soviet Union.
In April 1940 the Division was relocated back to western Ukraine and in May received a new draft of 1900 troops.
1941.
Op. Barbarossa.
Op. Barbarossa
The German invasion of the Soviet Union.
The Division was again stationed in the Ukraine as part of the 27th Rifle Corps, consisting 87th,124th & 135th Rifle Divisions of the 5th Army on the Southwestern Front, and manned the "Vladimir Volinski Fortified Region" (VVFR), of the Kiev Special Military District on the eve of the German invasion.
The VVFR frontage was 60 km and 5-6 km in depth and was based around 7 centres of resistance. Out of 141 planned strongholds,only 97 were operational and of the 6 planned Separate Artillery-Machine Gun Battalions, only 4 were operational on the day of the German invasion.
Despite intelligence reports and the German activity near the Soviet border, the Soviet leader Stalin refused to allow the Red Army forces on the frontier to come to full readiness in anticipation of an invasion.
Stalin believed Germany would not fight a war on two fronts, as in the First World War and also in case it was perceived by Germany to be an act of aggression by the Soviets if they mobilised. He was also suspicious of intelligence supplied by Britain, was a ploy to lure the Soviet Union into a war with Germany.
The Divisional commander, Maj. General Filipp Alyabushev is reported to have requested permission from his superiors to allow his unit to occupy the front line positions, but was denied as was the entire Red Army on the border.
At that time the Division only had two of it rifle regiments, the 96th and 283rd in the immediate frontier area, the 16th was was engaged in construction work behind the front lines.
Just before 0400 hrs on Sunday 22nd June 1941, Germany and its Axis armies invaded the Soviet Union, Op. Barbarossa as it was know. The Axis forces consisted of 3.6 million soldiers, 3,600 tanks, 2,700 aircraft, 7,000 artillery pieces, 600,000 motor vehicles, and 625,000 horses. Today Op Barbarossa is still the largest ever land operation in recorded military history.
The Division was one of the first attacked by German forces during the opening hours of the war and was involved in the heavy fighting at the battle of Lutsk- Rovno. The German 6th Army and 1st Panzer Group attacked on two axis, north of Vladimir Volinski, Lutsk-Rovno and south towards Dubno and Ostrog. Lead elements of the 14th Panzer Division attacked south with the intention to encircle the Division. By the morning on the 23rd, the Division continued to hold the Ustilug area, but found itself under the threat of encirclement and received an order to withdraw in the direction of Vladimir-Volinski, after which it began to retreat to the Voynitsa railway station. On 24th June, the Division was encircled and attempts by the Division's then detached 16th Rifle Regiment to break through to the units of the encircled Division failed.
On 25th June, whilst reconnoitering a highway crossing, Maj. General Alyabushev was killed whilst personally leading a bayonet charge attempting to break through surrounding German forces.
The Division was again stationed in the Ukraine as part of the 27th Rifle Corps, consisting 87th,124th & 135th Rifle Divisions of the 5th Army on the Southwestern Front, and manned the "Vladimir Volinski Fortified Region" (VVFR), of the Kiev Special Military District on the eve of the German invasion.
The VVFR frontage was 60 km and 5-6 km in depth and was based around 7 centres of resistance. Out of 141 planned strongholds,only 97 were operational and of the 6 planned Separate Artillery-Machine Gun Battalions, only 4 were operational on the day of the German invasion.
Despite intelligence reports and the German activity near the Soviet border, the Soviet leader Stalin refused to allow the Red Army forces on the frontier to come to full readiness in anticipation of an invasion.
Stalin believed Germany would not fight a war on two fronts, as in the First World War and also in case it was perceived by Germany to be an act of aggression by the Soviets if they mobilised. He was also suspicious of intelligence supplied by Britain, was a ploy to lure the Soviet Union into a war with Germany.
The Divisional commander, Maj. General Filipp Alyabushev is reported to have requested permission from his superiors to allow his unit to occupy the front line positions, but was denied as was the entire Red Army on the border.
At that time the Division only had two of it rifle regiments, the 96th and 283rd in the immediate frontier area, the 16th was was engaged in construction work behind the front lines.
Just before 0400 hrs on Sunday 22nd June 1941, Germany and its Axis armies invaded the Soviet Union, Op. Barbarossa as it was know. The Axis forces consisted of 3.6 million soldiers, 3,600 tanks, 2,700 aircraft, 7,000 artillery pieces, 600,000 motor vehicles, and 625,000 horses. Today Op Barbarossa is still the largest ever land operation in recorded military history.
The Division was one of the first attacked by German forces during the opening hours of the war and was involved in the heavy fighting at the battle of Lutsk- Rovno. The German 6th Army and 1st Panzer Group attacked on two axis, north of Vladimir Volinski, Lutsk-Rovno and south towards Dubno and Ostrog. Lead elements of the 14th Panzer Division attacked south with the intention to encircle the Division. By the morning on the 23rd, the Division continued to hold the Ustilug area, but found itself under the threat of encirclement and received an order to withdraw in the direction of Vladimir-Volinski, after which it began to retreat to the Voynitsa railway station. On 24th June, the Division was encircled and attempts by the Division's then detached 16th Rifle Regiment to break through to the units of the encircled Division failed.
On 25th June, whilst reconnoitering a highway crossing, Maj. General Alyabushev was killed whilst personally leading a bayonet charge attempting to break through surrounding German forces.
On 1st July, the remaining 200 troops of the Division, broke out of the encirclement under the command of Colonel M.I Blanka, together with its banners and withdrew east to merge with 135th Rifle Division, which had by then withdrawn eastwards via Torchyn, Lutsk and Rovno direction.The Division was withdrawn from field service for reinforcement and replenishment. In August 1941 the Division was transferred to the 37th Army for participation in the defence of Kiev operations.
Colonel Nikolai Ivanovich Vasilyev, who had been Deputy Divisional Commander since May 1940, took over command of the Division, until its subsequent destruction during the Battle of Kiev the following September.
Colonel Nikolai Ivanovich Vasilyev, who had been Deputy Divisional Commander since May 1940, took over command of the Division, until its subsequent destruction during the Battle of Kiev the following September.
A schematic map showing the the operations on the Soviet border in the Vladimir Volinski Fortified Region between 22nd - 30th June 1941.
By the morning of 23rd June the Division was still holding on in the Ustilug area, however with it's endangered position it was ordered to move towards Vladimir Volinski, however by the 24th June it was surrounded. On the 1st July the last 200 remaining personnel of the Division, under the command of Colonel M.I Blanka, with it's Banners broke out of the encirclement and managed to rejoin the 5th Army.
The remnants of the Division were withdrawn as a field unit and by 7th July it had been relocated to Pervomaisk on the River Southern Bug for replenishment and refitting as part of Southwestern Front command. Later in the war on 1st April 1944 the Division would liberate Pervomaisk from retreating German forces during the Red Army advance westwards!
The 87th Rifle Division is shown in the centre of the map, having been surrounded by German forces.
The Battle for Kiev.
Schematic maps showing the situation between 31st August-26th September 1941 and the fall of Kiev and the subsequent encirclement battles of the Soviet Southwestern Front by German forces. By 31st August the Division is situated 90 km north of Kiev, west of the town of Oster, facing the German 51st Army Corps 113th and 262nd Divisions. By 14th September, the Division had made a fighting retreat southwards towards Brovary,25 km east of Kiev engaging with the German 56th and 111th Divisions of 51st Army Corps.
Battle for Kiev 23/8 - 26/9/1941.
The 5th, 21st, 26th and 37th Soviet Armies were involved in the Kiev Defensive Operations and the Division took part in the month long campaign in defence of the city and subsequent encirclement battles east of Kiev.
From 7 July to 20 August the Division was subordinated to the Southwestern Front command, then joined the 37th Army for the Battle of Kiev, where the Division was initially engaged 90 km north of the city, west of the town of Oster. During the ensuing encirclement of Kiev, the Division was engaged in a heavy fighting withdrawal south towards Brovary, 25 km east of the city.
As the encirclement progressed, on 11th September, General M.P Kirponos, Commander of the Southwestern Front made proposals to STAVKA to abandon Kiev and withdraw from the salient to the River Psyol, in the Kursk-Poltava area, to which Stalin emphatically refused and ordered the defence to continue! By the 13th September, the bottleneck from which the four armies of the Southwestern Front, could have withdrawn, was only 32 km wide, between Lokhvitsa and Lubny. On 14th September a further plea to STAVKA was made to abandon Kiev and reported that there were only a couple of days left in which to attempt to lead the armies out of the encirclement. The report was dubbed "panicky" and that the front commanders were not to lose their heads and carry out Stalin's orders of 11th September! On 16th September, the Germans closed the bottleneck and all four armies were surrounded.
Only 37th Army was still holding the Kiev bridgehead on the west bank of the Dnieper, the troops of which had suffered heavy losses, were disorganized and had lost most of their fighting capacity! It was not until 11.40 pm on 17th September that STAVKA had authorised the abandonment of Kiev was received by General Kirponos. The city fell to the Germans the next day.The 37th Army separated from the other armies, hopelessly continued the fight for Kiev in the vicinity for the next few days, and only then began to fight its way out, with little chance of success. Virtually destroyed, the Division therefore ceased to exist as an active field unit from 19th September.
After Kiev fell to the German advance on 19 September, the Division was encircled with the remnants of the 37th Army in a pocket around Boryspil to the southeast of the city. The remnants of the Division together and the 4th NKVD Railway Protection Division, were formed into a rearguard for the 37th Army, as the army attempted to break out of the pocket and escape to the east. Sappers from the 37th Army and the 4th NKVD Division blew up the bridges over the Dnieper and by early morning of 20 September, both units reached the eastern edge of the Darnitsky forest, 25 km east of the city.
A reconnaissance by the NKVD troops found that the planned escape route via Boryspil was blocked by German troops, and the fighting devolved into a series of increasingly desperate breakout attempts to the east. During the latter attempts, the Divisional Commander Colonel Vasilyev was killed in action north of Piryatin , 150 km east of Kiev at the end of September.
General Kirponos, the General Staff and Military Council of the Southwestern Front, unable to fly out, together with 800 troops broke out east, reaching Lokhvitsa, 215 km east of Kiev, where they were cut off by German armoured units. During the two day battle, on 20th September Army General M.P Kirponos, Chief of Staff General V.I Tupikov and War Council member M.A Burmistrenko were killed, with very few of the staff and other troops escaping. The ensuing scattered battles, which lasted until the end of September, during which tens of thousands of soldiers, officers and political personnel were killed or taken prisoner, many of them wounded, in the unequal struggle to break out east by the encircled armies.
Soviet and German statistics conflict, of the reported 677,000 troops of Southwestern Front at the start of Kiev operation, 163,000 were killed or wounded, 350-400,000 were captured in the encirclement battles and 150,500 succeeded in escaping. The Southwestern Front was virtually destroyed and ceased to exist as an operational force. However, the operation was subsequently instrumental in significantly delaying the future planned German attack on Moscow by several weeks.
During the occupation of Kiev between 1941-43, Germans forces were also responsible for the recorded atrocities at the Babi Yar ravine within the city, namely the massacres of 100,000 people, which included Jewish, Soviet POWs, nationalist, political and criminal prisoners and notably of the 33,771 Jews murdered over two days between 29-30th September 1941!
The Division was reformed on the basis of surviving members of the 87th Rifle Division, 3rd Airborne Corps and staff from 5th Airborne Brigade on 6th November and became an active field unit from 20th November 1941 with the 40th Army in the Kursk District.
The subordinate units within the 87th Rifle Division 1941 (2nd Formation) were as follows:
- 16th Rifle Regiment
- 96th Rifle Regiment
- 283rd Rifle Regiment
- 197th Artillery Regiment
- 85th Separate Anti-Tank Artillery Battalion
- 14th Separate Anti-Aircraft Artillery Battalion
- 43rd Reconnaissance Battalion
- 11th Sapper Battalion
- 14th Separate Communications Battalion
- 59th Medical-Sanitary Battalion
- 119th Separate Chemical Defense Company
- 86th Transport Company
- 137th Field Bakery
- 907th Field Post Office
- 403rd Field Cash Office
Members of the Southwestern Front Military Council.
Left to Right. Army Front Commander General M.P Kirponos, Chief of Staff General V.I Tupikov and War Council member & Secretary of the Central Committee of the Ukrainian Communist Party M.A Burmistrenko were all killed on 20th September 1941.
Left to Right. Army Front Commander General M.P Kirponos, Chief of Staff General V.I Tupikov and War Council member & Secretary of the Central Committee of the Ukrainian Communist Party M.A Burmistrenko were all killed on 20th September 1941.
Southwestern Front operations Winter 1941- Spring 1942.
The 87th Rifle Division (2nd formation) took part in the operations during the winter of 1941-42 at the junction of the southern flank of the Western Front and northern flank of the Southwestern Front.
The Division was on the right flank of the Timoshenko's Southwestern Front's 40th Army situated between Kursk and Voronezh between 17th November and 5th December 1941 and saw action against the German 48th Panzer Corps.
As a result of the offensives the Germans were pushed westward in some places on the front and outside Moscow, to over 300 km in some areas.
A number of Soviet Divisions who distinguished themselves during the operations were awarded Guards status, the 87th Rifle Division being amongst those recognised during the defensive and counter offensive operations.
Map: 40th Army.
The 87th Rifle Division's position is shown at the foot of the map, between the recently formed 2nd Guards Rifle Division and the 62nd Rifle Divisions, facing the German 16th Infantry (Motorised) Division of the 48th Panzer Corps.
1942.
13th Guards.
Guards badge.
The 13th Guards Rifle Division is formed.
On 19th January 1942 the 87th Rifle Division was officially awarded Guards status (HKO 13 of that date)
and was re designated the 13th Guards Rifle Division officially on 4th March 1942.
Honorific Guards titles were awarded by the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR to units that had distinguished themselves in combat operations. Rodimtsev was promoted to command the new Division. The Division became part of the 28th Army of the Southwestern Front.
The subordinate units within the 13th Guards were as follows:
- 34th, 39th & 42nd Guards Rifle Regiments. Formerly 16th, 96th & 283rd Rifle Regiments of the disbanded 87th Rifle Division.
- 32nd Guards Artillery Regiment.
- 4th Guards Anti-Tank Battalion.
- 8th Guards Sapper Battalion.
- 14th Reconnaissance Company.
- 39th Signal Battalion.
- 12th Chemical Warfare Company.
- 11th Transport Company.
- 17th Field Bakery.
- 15th Medical Battalion.
- 2nd Veterinary Hospital.
The Division was commanded as follows during the war:
Gen Maj A.I Rodimtsev 1942- 43.
Gen Maj G.V Baklanov 1943- 44.
Col V.N Komarov 1944- 45.
The Order of Lenin.
Order of Lenin.
During the spring offensives, for courage and bravery and the exemplary fulfillment of the combat assignments and successful military operations in the Kursk area of the front, by the decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR of March 27, 1942, the Division was awarded the Order of Lenin.
Instituted on 5th May 1930, the order "Order of Lenin" was awarded to individuals, collectives, institutions, enterprises and voluntary organisations of the USSR for promoting the acceleration of socialist construction. All Heroes of the Soviet Union and Heroes of Socialist Labour were also awarded with an Order of Lenin. Units awarded the Order adopted the "Order of Lenin" in their respective unit titles. During the Great Patriotic War more than 41,000 servicemen and civilians received the Order, including 207 awards to military units for distinguished combat service.
After completing replenishment the Division was relocated to Kupyansk on the Oskil River, 123 km southeast of Kharkov as part of the 28th Army of the Southwestern Front and took part in the Kharkov operations.
Instituted on 5th May 1930, the order "Order of Lenin" was awarded to individuals, collectives, institutions, enterprises and voluntary organisations of the USSR for promoting the acceleration of socialist construction. All Heroes of the Soviet Union and Heroes of Socialist Labour were also awarded with an Order of Lenin. Units awarded the Order adopted the "Order of Lenin" in their respective unit titles. During the Great Patriotic War more than 41,000 servicemen and civilians received the Order, including 207 awards to military units for distinguished combat service.
After completing replenishment the Division was relocated to Kupyansk on the Oskil River, 123 km southeast of Kharkov as part of the 28th Army of the Southwestern Front and took part in the Kharkov operations.
Second Battle of Kharkov.
Soviet POWs after Kharkov.
Kharkov Operations
Kharkov was one of the Soviet Union's most important strategic centres for railroad and air connections, as it not only connected the east-west and north-south parts of Ukraine, but also several central areas of the USSR, including the Crimea, Caucasus, Dnieper and Donbas regions. It was also of great military importance as the largest industrial centre for tank production as well as several other vital aircraft, armaments and other military materiel and equipment production. Hitler recognized Kharkov's military importance and the need to capture the city's industrial capacity as intact as possible, which was the main objective of the attacking German forces.
The 1st Battle of Kharkov took place between 20–24 October 1941, at the end of which the German 6th Army occupied the city. Whilst much of the city was damaged in the fighting, by the 20th October, the Soviets had almost completed the evacuation of industrial plants, having moved seventy major factory facilities to the east. During the subsequent occupation of the Kharkov region, the Germans confiscated large quantities of food to be used by its troops, which created acute shortages in the Ukraine, resulting in widespread starvation, of which many would die during the ensuing cold winter months.
As the 1st Battle of Kharkov was not in the 13th Guards sphere of operations or campaigns, it is therefore not covered here in the units history.
Second Battle of Kharkov 12/5 - 28/5/1942.
The Soviet operation was a new attempt to expand their strategic gains during the winter and spring offensives of 1941-42, when the Germans were pushed westwards from Moscow. The Soviet STAVKA allocated six armies under two fronts, the Southwestern had the 21st, 28th,38th & 6th Armies and supporting 21st & 23rd Tank Corps,2nd Cavalry Corps and three independent rifle divisions. The Southern Front had the 9th & 57th Armies, along with supporting three Guards Divisions, thirty Rifle Divisions, a Rifle Brigade, 24th Tank Corps and 5th Cavalry Corps.
The Division was involved in the offensive launched north of the Izium Salient against the German 6th Army and on the 12th May it was located at the southern-left flank of the 28th Army of the Southwestern Front at its junction with the northern-right flank of the 38th Army in the northern area of operations. By the next day the Division had advanced to Petrovskoe, some 28 km northeast of central Kharkov. After some initial success, particularly in the southern area of operations, the Soviets were halted by heavy German counter attacks between 17-19th May, as a result the Division was forced back east some 10 km west to the Velyka Babka River and the small town of Peremoga, situated some 38 km northeast of Kharkov.
The Division was engaged in heavy fighting against the German 191st and 211th Infantry Regiments of the 71st Infantry Division, 17th Army Corps. By 18th May the Soviet 162nd Rifle Division, situated north of the 13th Guards and the 266th Rifle Division situated to its south, were both forced to withdraw east, exposing the the 13th Guards in a salient and surrounded on three sides. At the risk of being encircled, the Division made a fighting withdrawal east towards the Velyka Babka River, thus straightening the Soviet defensive line in front of Peremoga by 19th-20th May and escaped immediate encirclement.
By the 24th May, the German counter attacks and pincer movements resulted in cutting off three Soviet armies from the rest of the front and the next day saw the commencement of the first Soviet efforts to break out and by the 26th May were confined in an area of 15 square kilometers and put an end to the Soviet counter offensives. On 28th May, Marshal Timoshenko, commander of the Kharkov operations ordered the official halt of all Soviet offensive manoeuvres, while attacks to break out of the encirclement continued until 30 May.
The Division took part the ensuing battles northeast of Kharkov retreating some 180-200 km east to avoid encirclement and by 6th July it had reached Valuyki. During the Kharkov campaign the Division had suffered 50% casualties and together with a number of other combat depleted units, it was withdrawn to rear echelon areas for replenishment. The Division was firstly deployed to the Rostov-on-Don region, travelling southeast of Rossosh, Boguchar, north of Lyhansk and Millerovo arriving at Morozovsk on 14th July and Tsimlyansk on the River Don on 15th July. The Division was withdrawn as a field army on 16th July and via Kotelnikovo it was sent northeast, bypassing Stalingrad west of the city to Dubovka, 50 km to the north. It crossed the River Volga to the east bank and onward to Kamyshin and Nikolayevsk on the Volga 180 km north of Stalingrad, arriving on 30th July. The Division then became part of the Army Reserve and undertook reinforcement and replenishment post the Kharkov campaign.
An estimated 277,000 Soviets were killed and captured in the subsequent encirclement battles. The Soviets failures are attributed mainly due to an under estimation of the German 6th Armies potential and over estimation by Stalin and STAVKA of their own newly formed units and freshly trained troops.
During the campaign the Divisional Commander Col. Rodimtsev was promoted to General Major on 21st May 1942.
Kharkov was one of the Soviet Union's most important strategic centres for railroad and air connections, as it not only connected the east-west and north-south parts of Ukraine, but also several central areas of the USSR, including the Crimea, Caucasus, Dnieper and Donbas regions. It was also of great military importance as the largest industrial centre for tank production as well as several other vital aircraft, armaments and other military materiel and equipment production. Hitler recognized Kharkov's military importance and the need to capture the city's industrial capacity as intact as possible, which was the main objective of the attacking German forces.
The 1st Battle of Kharkov took place between 20–24 October 1941, at the end of which the German 6th Army occupied the city. Whilst much of the city was damaged in the fighting, by the 20th October, the Soviets had almost completed the evacuation of industrial plants, having moved seventy major factory facilities to the east. During the subsequent occupation of the Kharkov region, the Germans confiscated large quantities of food to be used by its troops, which created acute shortages in the Ukraine, resulting in widespread starvation, of which many would die during the ensuing cold winter months.
As the 1st Battle of Kharkov was not in the 13th Guards sphere of operations or campaigns, it is therefore not covered here in the units history.
Second Battle of Kharkov 12/5 - 28/5/1942.
The Soviet operation was a new attempt to expand their strategic gains during the winter and spring offensives of 1941-42, when the Germans were pushed westwards from Moscow. The Soviet STAVKA allocated six armies under two fronts, the Southwestern had the 21st, 28th,38th & 6th Armies and supporting 21st & 23rd Tank Corps,2nd Cavalry Corps and three independent rifle divisions. The Southern Front had the 9th & 57th Armies, along with supporting three Guards Divisions, thirty Rifle Divisions, a Rifle Brigade, 24th Tank Corps and 5th Cavalry Corps.
The Division was involved in the offensive launched north of the Izium Salient against the German 6th Army and on the 12th May it was located at the southern-left flank of the 28th Army of the Southwestern Front at its junction with the northern-right flank of the 38th Army in the northern area of operations. By the next day the Division had advanced to Petrovskoe, some 28 km northeast of central Kharkov. After some initial success, particularly in the southern area of operations, the Soviets were halted by heavy German counter attacks between 17-19th May, as a result the Division was forced back east some 10 km west to the Velyka Babka River and the small town of Peremoga, situated some 38 km northeast of Kharkov.
The Division was engaged in heavy fighting against the German 191st and 211th Infantry Regiments of the 71st Infantry Division, 17th Army Corps. By 18th May the Soviet 162nd Rifle Division, situated north of the 13th Guards and the 266th Rifle Division situated to its south, were both forced to withdraw east, exposing the the 13th Guards in a salient and surrounded on three sides. At the risk of being encircled, the Division made a fighting withdrawal east towards the Velyka Babka River, thus straightening the Soviet defensive line in front of Peremoga by 19th-20th May and escaped immediate encirclement.
By the 24th May, the German counter attacks and pincer movements resulted in cutting off three Soviet armies from the rest of the front and the next day saw the commencement of the first Soviet efforts to break out and by the 26th May were confined in an area of 15 square kilometers and put an end to the Soviet counter offensives. On 28th May, Marshal Timoshenko, commander of the Kharkov operations ordered the official halt of all Soviet offensive manoeuvres, while attacks to break out of the encirclement continued until 30 May.
The Division took part the ensuing battles northeast of Kharkov retreating some 180-200 km east to avoid encirclement and by 6th July it had reached Valuyki. During the Kharkov campaign the Division had suffered 50% casualties and together with a number of other combat depleted units, it was withdrawn to rear echelon areas for replenishment. The Division was firstly deployed to the Rostov-on-Don region, travelling southeast of Rossosh, Boguchar, north of Lyhansk and Millerovo arriving at Morozovsk on 14th July and Tsimlyansk on the River Don on 15th July. The Division was withdrawn as a field army on 16th July and via Kotelnikovo it was sent northeast, bypassing Stalingrad west of the city to Dubovka, 50 km to the north. It crossed the River Volga to the east bank and onward to Kamyshin and Nikolayevsk on the Volga 180 km north of Stalingrad, arriving on 30th July. The Division then became part of the Army Reserve and undertook reinforcement and replenishment post the Kharkov campaign.
An estimated 277,000 Soviets were killed and captured in the subsequent encirclement battles. The Soviets failures are attributed mainly due to an under estimation of the German 6th Armies potential and over estimation by Stalin and STAVKA of their own newly formed units and freshly trained troops.
During the campaign the Divisional Commander Col. Rodimtsev was promoted to General Major on 21st May 1942.
Stalingrad.
Russian schematic map of Stalingrad city centre, showing 13th Guards arrival on 14/9/42..
The battle for Stalingrad 17/7/1942 - 2/2/1943.
The campaign to take Stalingrad began in July of 1942 out on the steppe west of the great bend of the River Don, some 100 km west of the city. In July the Soviet Supreme High Command (STAVKA) created the Stalingrad Front. It consisted of three armies from the High Command Reserve, namely 1st,5th and 7th from the Tula region south of Moscow and were redesignated as the 64th,63rd and 62nd Armies respectively. On 12th July these armies formed the core of the Stalingrad Front. The 62nd Army was initially under the command of Marshal Timoshenko.
On the 28th July Stalin issued Order 227, "Not a step back ", the Red Army was expected to stand and fight. The order introduced the use of "Zagradbats", (blocking detachments) to be deployed behind units to stiffen the resolve in attack and deter unauthorised retreat from the battlefield under fire, which could be enforced by immediate summary execution.
"Shtrafbats" (penal battalions) were also introduced, which were manned by officers and men mainly convicted of offences not committed under fire in rear echelons, such as desertion or showing a "reluctance to fight" and also inmates from Gulag labour camps. The most common role was that of infantry and viewed by many prisoners as tantamount to a death sentence, as they were usually assigned the most dangerous sectors of the front! The term of service in infantry penal battalions and companies was from one to three months (the maximum term was usually applied to offences potentially qualifying for the death penalty) Those who survived their term or had "atoned for their crimes in blood" i.e. wounded or had performed acts of heroism were returned to regular line units.
From September 1942 to May 1945 the total number of people convicted to penal units was 427,910, very few of which were known to have survived the war!
The assault on the city of Stalingrad.
By mid July the advancing German 6th Army had reached the River Don, only 100 km west of Stalingrad. In the ensuing battles, despite heroic defensive actions, the Soviet ground forces were continuously forced to retreat eastwards towards the city. By late August the Germans had forced the Don defences and on 23rd August, mobile elements of 14th Panzer Corps, 6th Army had reached the River Volga near the northern suburbs of Stalingrad.
On that same day the Luftwaffe commenced its bombing campaign, laying waste to the city, residential areas and workers settlements. During the first three days of bombing it is estimated 40,000 of its residents were killed!
By the end of August early September, after two weeks of exhausting battles the German 6th Army had encircled and closed off the city, forcing the withdrawing Soviet 62nd and 64th Armies to become entrenched on the city border lines. On the 10th September, Lt.Gen.Chuikov arrived in the city and took command of the Soviet 62nd Army, now occupying the city centre, residential and the factory districts and settlements north of the Tsaritsa river gorge. The area was dominated by the Mamaev Kurgan, a strategically important hill which overlooked the city. The 64th Army occupied the city south of the Tsaritsa gorge.
By the 13th September the situation was critical as the Germans had broken into the city and were threatening the main ferry crossing, where reinforcements and supplies were landed for the defenders on the west bank.
At this stage, the German forces surrounding the city north-south totalled 78,000 troops and around 150 tanks & assault guns.
The defending Soviet forces in the city and vicinity north-south totalled 52,000 troops and around 100 tanks, many of which were immobilised. Many of the defending Soviet formations had been reduced to 10% of their former strength who were totally spent, lacking ammunition and supplies!
Below are images of Stalingrad and its environs during the initial Luftwaffe bombing of 23rd August 1942.
The campaign to take Stalingrad began in July of 1942 out on the steppe west of the great bend of the River Don, some 100 km west of the city. In July the Soviet Supreme High Command (STAVKA) created the Stalingrad Front. It consisted of three armies from the High Command Reserve, namely 1st,5th and 7th from the Tula region south of Moscow and were redesignated as the 64th,63rd and 62nd Armies respectively. On 12th July these armies formed the core of the Stalingrad Front. The 62nd Army was initially under the command of Marshal Timoshenko.
On the 28th July Stalin issued Order 227, "Not a step back ", the Red Army was expected to stand and fight. The order introduced the use of "Zagradbats", (blocking detachments) to be deployed behind units to stiffen the resolve in attack and deter unauthorised retreat from the battlefield under fire, which could be enforced by immediate summary execution.
"Shtrafbats" (penal battalions) were also introduced, which were manned by officers and men mainly convicted of offences not committed under fire in rear echelons, such as desertion or showing a "reluctance to fight" and also inmates from Gulag labour camps. The most common role was that of infantry and viewed by many prisoners as tantamount to a death sentence, as they were usually assigned the most dangerous sectors of the front! The term of service in infantry penal battalions and companies was from one to three months (the maximum term was usually applied to offences potentially qualifying for the death penalty) Those who survived their term or had "atoned for their crimes in blood" i.e. wounded or had performed acts of heroism were returned to regular line units.
From September 1942 to May 1945 the total number of people convicted to penal units was 427,910, very few of which were known to have survived the war!
The assault on the city of Stalingrad.
By mid July the advancing German 6th Army had reached the River Don, only 100 km west of Stalingrad. In the ensuing battles, despite heroic defensive actions, the Soviet ground forces were continuously forced to retreat eastwards towards the city. By late August the Germans had forced the Don defences and on 23rd August, mobile elements of 14th Panzer Corps, 6th Army had reached the River Volga near the northern suburbs of Stalingrad.
On that same day the Luftwaffe commenced its bombing campaign, laying waste to the city, residential areas and workers settlements. During the first three days of bombing it is estimated 40,000 of its residents were killed!
By the end of August early September, after two weeks of exhausting battles the German 6th Army had encircled and closed off the city, forcing the withdrawing Soviet 62nd and 64th Armies to become entrenched on the city border lines. On the 10th September, Lt.Gen.Chuikov arrived in the city and took command of the Soviet 62nd Army, now occupying the city centre, residential and the factory districts and settlements north of the Tsaritsa river gorge. The area was dominated by the Mamaev Kurgan, a strategically important hill which overlooked the city. The 64th Army occupied the city south of the Tsaritsa gorge.
By the 13th September the situation was critical as the Germans had broken into the city and were threatening the main ferry crossing, where reinforcements and supplies were landed for the defenders on the west bank.
At this stage, the German forces surrounding the city north-south totalled 78,000 troops and around 150 tanks & assault guns.
The defending Soviet forces in the city and vicinity north-south totalled 52,000 troops and around 100 tanks, many of which were immobilised. Many of the defending Soviet formations had been reduced to 10% of their former strength who were totally spent, lacking ammunition and supplies!
Below are images of Stalingrad and its environs during the initial Luftwaffe bombing of 23rd August 1942.
Stalingrad.
Soviet infantry assault.
The 13th Guards and the Battle of Stalingrad.
Late on the evening of 11th September, Stalin realising the serious situation inside the city, ordered Maj. Gen Rodimtsev's 13th Guards Rifle Division to reinforce the 62nd Army in the city.
The Division as part of the Reserve Armies had been refitting at Kamyshin since 30th July, post the Second Battle of Kharkov. Kamyshin is situated on the Volga river about 180 km north of Stalingrad. The Division undertook a forced march across the Kalmyk steppe to Stalingrad, arriving piecemeal and fragmented late on 13th September and during 14th September at Krasnaya Sloboda on the east bank.
Truth or Myth?
The Division, consisted of between 9,550 to 10,000 men, mainly of inexperienced combat troops, who were tired after their long march, were under equipped, low on ammunition and actually did arrive at Stalingrad 1,000 rifles short of its established TO&E. However, those shortages were mainly in Divisional rear services and artillery units on the east bank of the river and not the front line rifle battalions about to go into battle in the city!
On arrival at Krasnaya Sloboda on the afternoon of the 14th, General Rodimtsev was summoned to the west bank to the 62nd Army HQ's in the city and met with General Chuikov and the Front Military Council and received orders for the Divisions initial objectives. The situation regarding Divisional weapons shortages was duly raised and Front Deputy Commander Lt General F.I Golikov was appointed to see that the weapons required were delivered to the Division by the evening of 14th September. Maj. General Quartermaster Services A.I Lobov, Chief of Rear Service, 62nd Army on the east bank of the Volga arranged the collection of weapons from other rear units, which were delivered before the Division crossed over to the city. Also,as the Division did not have its full complement of heavy machine guns it was further supplemented by additional sub machine guns,which were better suited for fighting in the city. Also, the Divisions units did not cross all at the same time, some not until the evening of the 15th and on 16th September. Therefore, contrary to the myth of " one rifle for two soldiers" of the Division who were initially sent into battle did not happen and is the result of Soviet period propaganda!
At just before dusk on 14th September, the Division was ordered to cross the Volga with the objective to establish a bridgehead and reinforce the ferry landing and the immediate city centre areas, which was under direct attack by the Germans, who were in places only 100 meters from the river. Leaving their heavy weapons on the east bank, taking only personal weapons, machine guns, grenades, anti tank rifles and guns and light mortars, the 1st Battalion, 42nd Guards Rifle Regt of the Division were first to cross the Volga with orders to secure a bridgehead at the ferry landing for the rest of the Division to follow.
Crossing on armoured gunboats, tugs and barges, the 42nd Regt was subjected to bombardment by artillery and from the air as well as machine gun fire from the west bank. During the crossing numerous guardsmen were killed or drowned. Around midnight, the 42nd Guards Rifle Regiment of Colonel I.P. Yelin began to cross, the 1st Battalion, reinforced by a company of machine gunners and detachments of 45 mm anti-tank guns, had landed on the west bank with the task of clearing the crossing area from the Germans and secured a foothold on the bridgehead. However, contrary to commander Rodimtsev's orders, the guardsmen of the 1st Battalion, bypassing the "House of Specialists" occupied by the Germans from the south, on the direct orders of Gen. Chuikov under cover of the steep bank, began to advance further into the city centre.
Once landed the 42nd Regt joined units of the 10th NKVD Battalion fighting at the Stalingrad No.1 railway station and managed to push back the German forces.
The second wave, the 39th Guards Rifle Regt of the Division followed and captured the Flour Mill and advanced to the eastern foot of the Mamaev Kurgan. The Division stemmed the German advance and the fighting continued overnight. The Division's intervention on the 14th September was crucial in the defence in the city. However, it was a costly intervention as 30% of the Division were killed in the first 24 hours of landing on the west bank and Divisional casualties were high as 80% within a week! A NKVD report estimated the 13th Guards had an active strength of only 500 men left by the 23rd September, that is of the original Division of 10.000 who had crossed the Volga nine days earlier!
Late on the evening of 11th September, Stalin realising the serious situation inside the city, ordered Maj. Gen Rodimtsev's 13th Guards Rifle Division to reinforce the 62nd Army in the city.
The Division as part of the Reserve Armies had been refitting at Kamyshin since 30th July, post the Second Battle of Kharkov. Kamyshin is situated on the Volga river about 180 km north of Stalingrad. The Division undertook a forced march across the Kalmyk steppe to Stalingrad, arriving piecemeal and fragmented late on 13th September and during 14th September at Krasnaya Sloboda on the east bank.
Truth or Myth?
The Division, consisted of between 9,550 to 10,000 men, mainly of inexperienced combat troops, who were tired after their long march, were under equipped, low on ammunition and actually did arrive at Stalingrad 1,000 rifles short of its established TO&E. However, those shortages were mainly in Divisional rear services and artillery units on the east bank of the river and not the front line rifle battalions about to go into battle in the city!
On arrival at Krasnaya Sloboda on the afternoon of the 14th, General Rodimtsev was summoned to the west bank to the 62nd Army HQ's in the city and met with General Chuikov and the Front Military Council and received orders for the Divisions initial objectives. The situation regarding Divisional weapons shortages was duly raised and Front Deputy Commander Lt General F.I Golikov was appointed to see that the weapons required were delivered to the Division by the evening of 14th September. Maj. General Quartermaster Services A.I Lobov, Chief of Rear Service, 62nd Army on the east bank of the Volga arranged the collection of weapons from other rear units, which were delivered before the Division crossed over to the city. Also,as the Division did not have its full complement of heavy machine guns it was further supplemented by additional sub machine guns,which were better suited for fighting in the city. Also, the Divisions units did not cross all at the same time, some not until the evening of the 15th and on 16th September. Therefore, contrary to the myth of " one rifle for two soldiers" of the Division who were initially sent into battle did not happen and is the result of Soviet period propaganda!
At just before dusk on 14th September, the Division was ordered to cross the Volga with the objective to establish a bridgehead and reinforce the ferry landing and the immediate city centre areas, which was under direct attack by the Germans, who were in places only 100 meters from the river. Leaving their heavy weapons on the east bank, taking only personal weapons, machine guns, grenades, anti tank rifles and guns and light mortars, the 1st Battalion, 42nd Guards Rifle Regt of the Division were first to cross the Volga with orders to secure a bridgehead at the ferry landing for the rest of the Division to follow.
Crossing on armoured gunboats, tugs and barges, the 42nd Regt was subjected to bombardment by artillery and from the air as well as machine gun fire from the west bank. During the crossing numerous guardsmen were killed or drowned. Around midnight, the 42nd Guards Rifle Regiment of Colonel I.P. Yelin began to cross, the 1st Battalion, reinforced by a company of machine gunners and detachments of 45 mm anti-tank guns, had landed on the west bank with the task of clearing the crossing area from the Germans and secured a foothold on the bridgehead. However, contrary to commander Rodimtsev's orders, the guardsmen of the 1st Battalion, bypassing the "House of Specialists" occupied by the Germans from the south, on the direct orders of Gen. Chuikov under cover of the steep bank, began to advance further into the city centre.
Once landed the 42nd Regt joined units of the 10th NKVD Battalion fighting at the Stalingrad No.1 railway station and managed to push back the German forces.
The second wave, the 39th Guards Rifle Regt of the Division followed and captured the Flour Mill and advanced to the eastern foot of the Mamaev Kurgan. The Division stemmed the German advance and the fighting continued overnight. The Division's intervention on the 14th September was crucial in the defence in the city. However, it was a costly intervention as 30% of the Division were killed in the first 24 hours of landing on the west bank and Divisional casualties were high as 80% within a week! A NKVD report estimated the 13th Guards had an active strength of only 500 men left by the 23rd September, that is of the original Division of 10.000 who had crossed the Volga nine days earlier!
The Volga River Flotilla.
Although not forming part of the actual 13th Guards combat history during the battle of Stalingrad, the Volga River Flotilla took an active part throughout the battle and was critical to the fighting capability of the defenders in the city and to the Stalingrad Front. Therefore, its inclusion here in these pages is highly relevant and warranted as an important reference within the historical context of the battle and is dedicated to the sacrifices of those who served with the Volga River Flotilla.
During the 1920's and 30's the Soviets had developed a number of different classes of flotilla craft, including large and medium riverine, estuary and coastal gunboats and monitors as well as smaller lighter faster riverine armoured craft. On 12th November 1931, the RKKF(Workers Peasants Red Fleet) command authorised the creation for two types of small armoured boats, namely the 1124 and 1125 series vessels. The terms of the design were stipulated on 22nd June 1932 and to were to originally include two 76.2 mm open guns mounted fore and aft, with a twin 12.7 mm gun mounted midships on the armoured pilothouse and were to be powered by GAM-34 gasoline engines. Later, when they became available, the open gun mounts were replaced by 76.2 mm KT-28 howitzer mounted in two T28 or T35 tank turrets. From 1939 the turrets were fitted with L-10 76.2 mm cannon. The vessels were designed to be easily transported by railway and their decks were fitted with pad eyes to enable them to be lifted by crane onto rail flatbed wagons.
From 1942 onwards the vessels were fitted with T34/76.2 mm F-34 cannon tank turrets and later during the battle of Stalingrad, M-13-M 132mm "Katyusha" rocket launcher vessels were first deployed! In 1942 under the wartime Lend-Lease Program most of the 1124 and 1125 series boats were fitted with US supplied four-stroke Hall-Scott engines producing 900 hp and Packard engines up to 1200 hp. The engines were much more reliable than Soviet domestic ones and required high levels of servicing and high-octane gasoline fuel.
From 1943 to 1944 the MBK Class vessels were developed and built, basically larger versions of the 1124 series boats that were fitted with two T34/84 mm tank gun turrets with the more potent high velocity ZiS-53 gun and later with 100 mm guns. Riverine flotillas operated on many of the major inland waterways and lakes across the Soviet Union during the war.
The city of Stalingrad, formerly Tsaritsin had been a major trading port on the Volga River for several centuries and the river at central Stalingrad is up to 1 km wide. A month after the German invasion a special detachment was formed to train and crew up a Volga River Flotilla, which was formerly created on 27th October 1941. Crews were raised from sailors of the Baltic and Northern Fleets and were speedily deployed with the Volga River Flotilla. At the time the Volga River Flotilla initially consisted of 7 gunboats, 14 armoured boats, 33 minesweepers, 2 floating anti-aircraft batteries and a railway battery.
In September 1942 as the German threat to the city increased, two battalions of naval infantry were formed from sailors of Volga River Flotilla. Referred as the 92nd Naval Infantry Brigade(note: a misnomer as usually Soviet brigades consisted 3-5 battalions), it was sailors of the 92nd who famously defended the Grain Elevator in the southern part of the city against heavy German assaults! The Brigade appears to have been disbanded once the city was recaptured.
As the the battle front became closer to the Volga River in the autumn 1942, the strategic role of this major inland waterway became of greater importance to both the Soviets and the Germans. The Luftwaffe began maritime mine laying operations on the Volga to disrupt all shipping on the river and during a concentrated period had dropped up to 350 mines at Stalingrad and its environs.
However, the Volga Flotilla still did not have sufficient vessels to undertake minesweeping, protection and ferrying roles, therefore several additional wooden built vessels and barges plying the river were commandeered and were adapted and deployed with the flotilla. The Germans kept the river approaches to Stalingrad under consistent artillery and aerial attacks on vessels both at ports and en route. Operating mainly during the hours of darkness the flotilla kept on transporting troops, material and supplies to the city of Stalingrad during the battle as well as operating essential military and national economic cargo supply convoy protection operations on the Volga.
In all, the Volga Flotilla undertook some 35,000 crossings to the city and also supported Soviet land operations with artillery fire support. More than fifty vessels were lost to Luftwaffe bombing and some twenty vessels were sunk due to maritime mines during the battle of Stalingrad. The flotillas personnel displayed extreme heroism and courage and the triumph at Stalingrad depended on the flotillas continued supply of reinforcements and supplies and its actions were surely equal to that of the defenders fighting in the city!
Although not forming part of the actual 13th Guards combat history during the battle of Stalingrad, the Volga River Flotilla took an active part throughout the battle and was critical to the fighting capability of the defenders in the city and to the Stalingrad Front. Therefore, its inclusion here in these pages is highly relevant and warranted as an important reference within the historical context of the battle and is dedicated to the sacrifices of those who served with the Volga River Flotilla.
During the 1920's and 30's the Soviets had developed a number of different classes of flotilla craft, including large and medium riverine, estuary and coastal gunboats and monitors as well as smaller lighter faster riverine armoured craft. On 12th November 1931, the RKKF(Workers Peasants Red Fleet) command authorised the creation for two types of small armoured boats, namely the 1124 and 1125 series vessels. The terms of the design were stipulated on 22nd June 1932 and to were to originally include two 76.2 mm open guns mounted fore and aft, with a twin 12.7 mm gun mounted midships on the armoured pilothouse and were to be powered by GAM-34 gasoline engines. Later, when they became available, the open gun mounts were replaced by 76.2 mm KT-28 howitzer mounted in two T28 or T35 tank turrets. From 1939 the turrets were fitted with L-10 76.2 mm cannon. The vessels were designed to be easily transported by railway and their decks were fitted with pad eyes to enable them to be lifted by crane onto rail flatbed wagons.
From 1942 onwards the vessels were fitted with T34/76.2 mm F-34 cannon tank turrets and later during the battle of Stalingrad, M-13-M 132mm "Katyusha" rocket launcher vessels were first deployed! In 1942 under the wartime Lend-Lease Program most of the 1124 and 1125 series boats were fitted with US supplied four-stroke Hall-Scott engines producing 900 hp and Packard engines up to 1200 hp. The engines were much more reliable than Soviet domestic ones and required high levels of servicing and high-octane gasoline fuel.
From 1943 to 1944 the MBK Class vessels were developed and built, basically larger versions of the 1124 series boats that were fitted with two T34/84 mm tank gun turrets with the more potent high velocity ZiS-53 gun and later with 100 mm guns. Riverine flotillas operated on many of the major inland waterways and lakes across the Soviet Union during the war.
The city of Stalingrad, formerly Tsaritsin had been a major trading port on the Volga River for several centuries and the river at central Stalingrad is up to 1 km wide. A month after the German invasion a special detachment was formed to train and crew up a Volga River Flotilla, which was formerly created on 27th October 1941. Crews were raised from sailors of the Baltic and Northern Fleets and were speedily deployed with the Volga River Flotilla. At the time the Volga River Flotilla initially consisted of 7 gunboats, 14 armoured boats, 33 minesweepers, 2 floating anti-aircraft batteries and a railway battery.
In September 1942 as the German threat to the city increased, two battalions of naval infantry were formed from sailors of Volga River Flotilla. Referred as the 92nd Naval Infantry Brigade(note: a misnomer as usually Soviet brigades consisted 3-5 battalions), it was sailors of the 92nd who famously defended the Grain Elevator in the southern part of the city against heavy German assaults! The Brigade appears to have been disbanded once the city was recaptured.
As the the battle front became closer to the Volga River in the autumn 1942, the strategic role of this major inland waterway became of greater importance to both the Soviets and the Germans. The Luftwaffe began maritime mine laying operations on the Volga to disrupt all shipping on the river and during a concentrated period had dropped up to 350 mines at Stalingrad and its environs.
However, the Volga Flotilla still did not have sufficient vessels to undertake minesweeping, protection and ferrying roles, therefore several additional wooden built vessels and barges plying the river were commandeered and were adapted and deployed with the flotilla. The Germans kept the river approaches to Stalingrad under consistent artillery and aerial attacks on vessels both at ports and en route. Operating mainly during the hours of darkness the flotilla kept on transporting troops, material and supplies to the city of Stalingrad during the battle as well as operating essential military and national economic cargo supply convoy protection operations on the Volga.
In all, the Volga Flotilla undertook some 35,000 crossings to the city and also supported Soviet land operations with artillery fire support. More than fifty vessels were lost to Luftwaffe bombing and some twenty vessels were sunk due to maritime mines during the battle of Stalingrad. The flotillas personnel displayed extreme heroism and courage and the triumph at Stalingrad depended on the flotillas continued supply of reinforcements and supplies and its actions were surely equal to that of the defenders fighting in the city!
Above:two images of the standard 1124 series armoured patrol boats, distinguished by its T34 76.2mm gun tank turrets fore and aft of the vessel and midships either a single or dual 12.7 DShK AA heavy machine gun in either an open or enclosed turret. Later, some 1124 series boat variants had the aft tank turret replaced by a traversing M-13-M 132mm rocket launcher frame. The vessels had a flat bottomed hull with a shallow draught, enabling them to easily beach for troop and supply landings. The crew on deck give a perspective as to the small size of the vessel.
Specs:
Displacement: 42 tonnes standard
Dimensions: 25 m x 3.80 m x 0,80 m draught.
Propulsion: 2 screws, 2x gasoline engines either GAM-34BP or GAM-34BS, producing a combined 1600 at 1850 rpm.
Top speed: 28 knots
Armour: 15 to 50 mm
Armament: 2 x 76.2mm guns, 2x 12.7 mm HMG AA
Crew: 17
Specs:
Displacement: 42 tonnes standard
Dimensions: 25 m x 3.80 m x 0,80 m draught.
Propulsion: 2 screws, 2x gasoline engines either GAM-34BP or GAM-34BS, producing a combined 1600 at 1850 rpm.
Top speed: 28 knots
Armour: 15 to 50 mm
Armament: 2 x 76.2mm guns, 2x 12.7 mm HMG AA
Crew: 17
Above:two images of the standard 1125 series armoured river patrol boats, which were similar in construction to the 1124 series boats but were slightly smaller. Distinguished by its single T34 76.2mm gun tank turret fore of the vessel, with three
single 7.62mm machine gun PB-5 turrets, mounted fore of the tank turret,midships and aft respectively.Later variants had a dual 12.7 DShK AA heavy machine gun in either an open or enclosed turret mounted midships. Also, the Volga River Flotilla pioneered the use a traversing M-13-M 132mm rocket launcher frame in lieu of the aft 7.62mm PB-5 turret, as shown at right.
The 1124 and 1125 series vessels were the most common in use during the war by the various river and lake flotillas.
Specs:
Displacement: 29 tonnes standard
Dimensions: 22.6 m x 3.50 m x 0.50 m draught.
Propulsion: 1 screw, 1x gasoline engine either GAM-34BP or GAM-34BS, producing between 720-800 hp at 1850 rpm.
Top speed: 28 knots
Armour: 12 to 50 mm
Armament: 1 x 76.2 mm gun, 1 x 12.7 mm HMG AA, 2 x 7.62 mm LMG AA
Crew: 10
Below: two images of the standard 1124 series armoured river patrol boats which were mounted with two PVO 76.2mm M1914 Lender AA guns fore and aft of the vessel. A dual 12.7 DShK AA heavy machine gun in either an open or enclosed turret was mounted midships on the armoured pilothouse.
single 7.62mm machine gun PB-5 turrets, mounted fore of the tank turret,midships and aft respectively.Later variants had a dual 12.7 DShK AA heavy machine gun in either an open or enclosed turret mounted midships. Also, the Volga River Flotilla pioneered the use a traversing M-13-M 132mm rocket launcher frame in lieu of the aft 7.62mm PB-5 turret, as shown at right.
The 1124 and 1125 series vessels were the most common in use during the war by the various river and lake flotillas.
Specs:
Displacement: 29 tonnes standard
Dimensions: 22.6 m x 3.50 m x 0.50 m draught.
Propulsion: 1 screw, 1x gasoline engine either GAM-34BP or GAM-34BS, producing between 720-800 hp at 1850 rpm.
Top speed: 28 knots
Armour: 12 to 50 mm
Armament: 1 x 76.2 mm gun, 1 x 12.7 mm HMG AA, 2 x 7.62 mm LMG AA
Crew: 10
Below: two images of the standard 1124 series armoured river patrol boats which were mounted with two PVO 76.2mm M1914 Lender AA guns fore and aft of the vessel. A dual 12.7 DShK AA heavy machine gun in either an open or enclosed turret was mounted midships on the armoured pilothouse.
Below: are a series of images of the different classes of vessels used by the various Soviet Union coastal, riverine and lake flotillas, showing the array of armament configurations that were adopted during the war.
Armoured Patrol Boat -31 (бронекатер - 31 ) sunk during the Battle of Stalingrad 1942.
Stalingrad. The battles for the city!
The site of Colonel Yelins 42nd Guards Rifle Regiments landing place on the Volga embankment on the evening of 14th September, adjacent the Brewery and the buildings of the NKVD complex. In the centre of the image is the chimney of Mill No. 4, as yet undamaged and to the right the Refinery is burning
Stalingrad.
Aerial photo of the Kurgan taken before
the battle.The Volga is just out of view at the bottom of the image.
During the five month battle for the city of Stalingrad the Division took part in several key actions.
From the very first days in the city the Division fought for the Mamaev Kurgan. The Mamaev Kurgan was an ancient Tartar burial mound on top of the hill which dominated the city of Stalingrad.
Its summit was 102 meters above sea level, situated northwest of the city centre and between the factory districts and it had been parkland for the Stalingrad residents since before the war. Whoever held the hill had the strategic domination of the city and also the Soviet ferry crossings.
During the initial two month battle for the Kurgan, the summit changed hands several times in fierce battles between Soviet and German forces to take and hold the hill. Literally entire Divisions were wiped out during the course of a days fighting, such was the determination to take Hill 102! The human costs to both sides was extremely high during the 200 day battle for the hill and the true casualty figures may never be known. There are varied estimates of the casualties for the whole campaign to take Stalingrad from different scholars and sources. The killed, missing, wounded, and captured Axis forces are put as high as 1,500,000 and the Soviets, similarly as high as 1,129,600.
Below are two images of the Mamaev Kurgan. Left: Taken before the battle. At the top are the industrial and residential areas at the foot of the hill and between the River Volga. (Note: The smoke in the upper left of the image is from a passing steam locomotive) Right: Taken after the battle. A view looking in the same general direction showing the devastation on the hill and the total destruction of the built up area beyond and in comparison with the adjacent image.
From the very first days in the city the Division fought for the Mamaev Kurgan. The Mamaev Kurgan was an ancient Tartar burial mound on top of the hill which dominated the city of Stalingrad.
Its summit was 102 meters above sea level, situated northwest of the city centre and between the factory districts and it had been parkland for the Stalingrad residents since before the war. Whoever held the hill had the strategic domination of the city and also the Soviet ferry crossings.
During the initial two month battle for the Kurgan, the summit changed hands several times in fierce battles between Soviet and German forces to take and hold the hill. Literally entire Divisions were wiped out during the course of a days fighting, such was the determination to take Hill 102! The human costs to both sides was extremely high during the 200 day battle for the hill and the true casualty figures may never be known. There are varied estimates of the casualties for the whole campaign to take Stalingrad from different scholars and sources. The killed, missing, wounded, and captured Axis forces are put as high as 1,500,000 and the Soviets, similarly as high as 1,129,600.
Below are two images of the Mamaev Kurgan. Left: Taken before the battle. At the top are the industrial and residential areas at the foot of the hill and between the River Volga. (Note: The smoke in the upper left of the image is from a passing steam locomotive) Right: Taken after the battle. A view looking in the same general direction showing the devastation on the hill and the total destruction of the built up area beyond and in comparison with the adjacent image.
Above: Two images of the same area of the hill. The trench lines and defensive positions are clearly visible.
Below are a series of schematic maps which show the situation of the 13th Guards positions during the battle of Stalingrad at various stages between 17th September and 4th December 1942. The maps indicate the desperate situation in which the Division was in during the defence of the city centre at that time. The map of 25-27th September shows the situation of 1st Battalion 42 Guards Rifle Regiment as a fighting unit having being destroyed. Of the 1st Battalion, only Lt Dragan and five of the surviving Guardsmen were able to eventually escape back to Regimental lines near the River Volga!
25th-27th September 1942. The 42nd Regiment positions are shown (deleted) in the Kommunisticheskaya, Krasnopiterskaya and Komsomolskaya Streets area,where approximately 40 remaining soldiers barricaded themselves into a 3 storey building. There they held out for five days, when on the night of 26/27th September Lt Dragan and five remaining guardsmen managed to escape back Divisional lines on the River Volga embankments.
Soldiers fire a volley in honour of the fallen defenders of the Mamaev Kurgan.
On 26th January 1943, the Mamaev Kurgan and its environs were completely cleared of German forces. On 8th February, just six days after the end of the battle of Stalingrad the Soviet defenders of the Mamaev Kurgan were buried. In their honour a salute thundered from the weapons of the soldiers who took part in the defence of the city. A simple monument was erected over the grave, a wooden obelisk bearing two crossed rifles.
For several years after the war, trees and grass would not grow on the hill due to the contamination from the huge amounts of metal from shells and bombs that were dropped on the Kurgan during the battles. Even today on the Kurgan one may find small remnants of human bones and rusting metal splinters in the earth!
For several years after the war, trees and grass would not grow on the hill due to the contamination from the huge amounts of metal from shells and bombs that were dropped on the Kurgan during the battles. Even today on the Kurgan one may find small remnants of human bones and rusting metal splinters in the earth!
Stalingrad.
Station No.1 after the battle.
The 1st "Lost Battalion" 42nd Guards Rifle Regiment, Stalingrad Railway Station No.1 and the "Nail Factory".
On the evening of 14th September Gen. Chuikov and Gen. Rodimtsev of the newly arrived 13th Guards, personally met and planned the Divisions initial objectives. Unbeknown to Rodimtsev, Chuikov superseded and ordered a plan to send a reinforced Battalion through the city to recapture the No. 1 Central Railway Station overnight. The intention was to tie up as many German troops as possible in their inevitable counterattack on the bridgehead.
The station had been previously damaged by German aerial bombing in August and was now a stronghold for the Germans in the city centre.The task was given to Lieutenant Chervyakov’s 1st Batt, 42nd Guards Rifle Regiment.
Supported by three KV-1 tanks of 133rd Tank Brigade, the Guards retook the station and fought off several German counter attacks before dawn the following day, having been surrounded on three sides during the night.
The Guards attack on the Central Railway Station in the early morning hours of September 15th was a success. However, the fighting in the station was savage, but the Soviets were able to fend off several German counter-attacks. On the evening of the 15th the Luftwaffe bombed the station setting it ablaze again, forcing the surviving Guardsmen to abandoned it. The close quarter defence continued on the station platforms, the rail yards, the station square and nearby "Nail Factory". Early morning on 16th September the Germans bombed and shelled the station and with twenty tanks forced the Soviets out of the station. The Guards counter attacked and retook the station, only to lose it and recapture it again by dusk. During the five days of fighting for the station it purportedly changed hands fifteen times!
Overnight on the 15th September the remainder of the 42nd Guards Rifle Regt was ferried across the Volga and at dawn on the 16th September it was deployed to the Mamaev Kurgan to support the NKVD division struggling to hold the summit. The summit was recaptured in fierce hand to hand fighting and finally was consolidated by 18th September despite several German counter attacks. On the evening of 19th the 42nd Guards were withdrawn from the Mamaev Kurgan to support the weakened Division in the city centre. That night a storm group from the 42nd Guards retook the heavily defended "Railwayman's House" in the city.
On the 17th Lt. Chervyakov was severely wounded, leaving the battalion deputy commander Lt. Fedoseyev in charge of the defence. Fedoseyev moved his command post to the basement of the nearby Univermag department store, with Lt. Dragan, 1st Company holding the Nail Factory. By the 18th the station was more or less in German hands and the Battalion's remnants had moved to the Nail Factory. On the evening of 21st the battalion's positions were cut in two by the Germans, who closed in from three sides over running the Battalion HQ. Lt. Fedoseyev and his HQ staff were reportedly killed on the 21st in the
Univermag department store and command fell to Lt. Anton Dragan, who had been surrounded with the remnants of the Battalion in the Nail Factory since the 20th.
Note: During the confused and fractured nature of the initial fighting in the city centre by the Division and units becoming isolated from HQ's, it is therefore understandable accounts and reports contain some discrepancies and conflicting evidence. Also, state party politics, propaganda and ideals greatly influenced what was generally released to the Soviet population during the war.
13th Guards Division records and also memoirs of Colonel Yelin, 42nd Regiment commander, reveal brief messages via radio were still being received from Lt Fedoseyev's battalion HQ's until 25th September,when radio communications finally fell silent. Division records for the 24th September report 1st Battalion 42nd Guards Regiment line of defence was indicated vaguely as in Ostrovsky,Gogol and Volgodonskaya streets areas. Further, Colonel Yelin's memoirs recall that regimental scouts Khutornoy and Stoletov were sent to Station No.1,who got into the area occupied by the Germans and found Lt Fedoseyev there. Khutornoy was killed during the return trip, and the seriously wounded Stoletov handed Colonel Yelin a note from Lt Fedoseyev, which read “There are nine of us left. All are injured. We will fight to the end."
There are discrepancies in Lt Dragan's and a number of other witness accounts of where and under what circumstances the HQ's of the 1st Battalion and its commander, Snr Lt Fedoseyev were killed and is still not known for certain!
On the evening of 14th September Gen. Chuikov and Gen. Rodimtsev of the newly arrived 13th Guards, personally met and planned the Divisions initial objectives. Unbeknown to Rodimtsev, Chuikov superseded and ordered a plan to send a reinforced Battalion through the city to recapture the No. 1 Central Railway Station overnight. The intention was to tie up as many German troops as possible in their inevitable counterattack on the bridgehead.
The station had been previously damaged by German aerial bombing in August and was now a stronghold for the Germans in the city centre.The task was given to Lieutenant Chervyakov’s 1st Batt, 42nd Guards Rifle Regiment.
Supported by three KV-1 tanks of 133rd Tank Brigade, the Guards retook the station and fought off several German counter attacks before dawn the following day, having been surrounded on three sides during the night.
The Guards attack on the Central Railway Station in the early morning hours of September 15th was a success. However, the fighting in the station was savage, but the Soviets were able to fend off several German counter-attacks. On the evening of the 15th the Luftwaffe bombed the station setting it ablaze again, forcing the surviving Guardsmen to abandoned it. The close quarter defence continued on the station platforms, the rail yards, the station square and nearby "Nail Factory". Early morning on 16th September the Germans bombed and shelled the station and with twenty tanks forced the Soviets out of the station. The Guards counter attacked and retook the station, only to lose it and recapture it again by dusk. During the five days of fighting for the station it purportedly changed hands fifteen times!
Overnight on the 15th September the remainder of the 42nd Guards Rifle Regt was ferried across the Volga and at dawn on the 16th September it was deployed to the Mamaev Kurgan to support the NKVD division struggling to hold the summit. The summit was recaptured in fierce hand to hand fighting and finally was consolidated by 18th September despite several German counter attacks. On the evening of 19th the 42nd Guards were withdrawn from the Mamaev Kurgan to support the weakened Division in the city centre. That night a storm group from the 42nd Guards retook the heavily defended "Railwayman's House" in the city.
On the 17th Lt. Chervyakov was severely wounded, leaving the battalion deputy commander Lt. Fedoseyev in charge of the defence. Fedoseyev moved his command post to the basement of the nearby Univermag department store, with Lt. Dragan, 1st Company holding the Nail Factory. By the 18th the station was more or less in German hands and the Battalion's remnants had moved to the Nail Factory. On the evening of 21st the battalion's positions were cut in two by the Germans, who closed in from three sides over running the Battalion HQ. Lt. Fedoseyev and his HQ staff were reportedly killed on the 21st in the
Univermag department store and command fell to Lt. Anton Dragan, who had been surrounded with the remnants of the Battalion in the Nail Factory since the 20th.
Note: During the confused and fractured nature of the initial fighting in the city centre by the Division and units becoming isolated from HQ's, it is therefore understandable accounts and reports contain some discrepancies and conflicting evidence. Also, state party politics, propaganda and ideals greatly influenced what was generally released to the Soviet population during the war.
13th Guards Division records and also memoirs of Colonel Yelin, 42nd Regiment commander, reveal brief messages via radio were still being received from Lt Fedoseyev's battalion HQ's until 25th September,when radio communications finally fell silent. Division records for the 24th September report 1st Battalion 42nd Guards Regiment line of defence was indicated vaguely as in Ostrovsky,Gogol and Volgodonskaya streets areas. Further, Colonel Yelin's memoirs recall that regimental scouts Khutornoy and Stoletov were sent to Station No.1,who got into the area occupied by the Germans and found Lt Fedoseyev there. Khutornoy was killed during the return trip, and the seriously wounded Stoletov handed Colonel Yelin a note from Lt Fedoseyev, which read “There are nine of us left. All are injured. We will fight to the end."
There are discrepancies in Lt Dragan's and a number of other witness accounts of where and under what circumstances the HQ's of the 1st Battalion and its commander, Snr Lt Fedoseyev were killed and is still not known for certain!
Stalingrad.
The "Nail Factory".
The "Nail Factory".
This image shows the view from German positions northwest of Station No.1. In the foreground are the railway goods and marshalling yards. In the distance as indicated 1. 'Nail Factory', 2. 'House of Communes' 3. Central Station with the nearby water tower. The open expanse of the station square between the indicated buildings is clearly visible from the overlooking German positions.
The image of the famous Stalingrad landmark called the Children's Khorovod (Round Dance), known informally as the Barmaley, is of the fountain statue of a circle of six children dancing around a crocodile, situated on Prevokzal'naya Square outside Station No. 1.The original statue was removed in the 1950's, with a replica placed on the original site and another at Gerhardt's Mill, near the Stalingrad Panorama Museum in 2013. This image was taken in August 1942, showing the burning buildings of station concourse and is the result of German aerial bombing and before the street fighting in the city centre had began in September. .
Fighting for the Krasnaya Zastava nail manufacturing factory had began on the 17th September and by the 20th the remnants of 1st Batt 42nd Guards Rifle Regt were fighting in and around the sturdy three storey factory buildings workshops, corridors and offices, situated on the corner of Kommunisticheskaya and Gogolya Streets, directly opposite Station No.1 and Prevokzal'naya Square and adjacent to the Stalin Museum. The site is now occupied by the Museum of Military History and Monuments(formerly the Stalin Museum, rebuilt after the war), Block No. 6 Gogolya Street and Block No.9A Proletkul'tskaya Street. Throughout the 21st the Germans attacked the regiment with massed infantry and tanks and managed to cut the regiments positions in two and killed the battalion commander and his staff purportedly in the Univermag. Lt. Dragan who had taken control of the battalion and after further German attacks that night, organised its retreat and broke out with the remaining 100 Guardsmen of 1st Battalion. They fought towards the Volga and with only 40 remaining Guardsmen occupied a three storey house on the corners of Kommunisticheskaya, Krasnopiterskaya and Komsomolskaya Streets and barricaded themselves in.
The Guardsmen held out for five days, by which time only twelve men remained fighting, the rest were wounded and were sheltering in the basement. The Germans brought up tanks and commenced to demolish the building. On the night of 26th September, in the partially collapsed building and out of ammo and reduced to throwing stones at the enemy, Dragan's orderly Kozhushko, with his bayonet etched into the wall of the house, " Rodimtsev's Guardsmen fought and died for their Motherland here". That night, the wounded Lt Dragan and the five remaining Guardsmen of the 1st Battalion escaped back to Regimental lines near the Volga. Lt. Dragan after receiving treatment for his wounds was promoted to the rank of Captain and later became commander at 'Pavlov's House. Overnight 21st September the Division in the City had received 2,000 new replacements.
During all of the 22nd September German infantry, tanks and aircraft attacked the city centre, trying to cut off the 13th Guards from the rest of the 62nd Army. The Division reportedly repelled twelve attacks during the day, but as evening fell the Division was pushed back to a position just north of the central ferry landing. The sacrifices of the 1st Battalion, 42nd Guards Rifle Regiment, 13th Guards Rifle Division were not to be in vain, as the Red Army were able to hold the city by the narrowest of fronts. The Soviets were able to launch a massive counter-attack two months later which encircled and destroyed the German 6th Army.
The Guardsmen held out for five days, by which time only twelve men remained fighting, the rest were wounded and were sheltering in the basement. The Germans brought up tanks and commenced to demolish the building. On the night of 26th September, in the partially collapsed building and out of ammo and reduced to throwing stones at the enemy, Dragan's orderly Kozhushko, with his bayonet etched into the wall of the house, " Rodimtsev's Guardsmen fought and died for their Motherland here". That night, the wounded Lt Dragan and the five remaining Guardsmen of the 1st Battalion escaped back to Regimental lines near the Volga. Lt. Dragan after receiving treatment for his wounds was promoted to the rank of Captain and later became commander at 'Pavlov's House. Overnight 21st September the Division in the City had received 2,000 new replacements.
During all of the 22nd September German infantry, tanks and aircraft attacked the city centre, trying to cut off the 13th Guards from the rest of the 62nd Army. The Division reportedly repelled twelve attacks during the day, but as evening fell the Division was pushed back to a position just north of the central ferry landing. The sacrifices of the 1st Battalion, 42nd Guards Rifle Regiment, 13th Guards Rifle Division were not to be in vain, as the Red Army were able to hold the city by the narrowest of fronts. The Soviets were able to launch a massive counter-attack two months later which encircled and destroyed the German 6th Army.
A view looking from the square of Station No.1 . On the left of the image are the ruins of the Stalin Museum, the statue monument of the Soviet leader is visible in front of the building. Centre, the three-story 'Krasnaya Zastava' factory, known in reports as the 'Nail Factory'. The damaged corner of the building is the result of explosive mining by German sappers. Right, just visible is the partially ruined seven story building known as the House of Communes (Communal) Building.
The bodies of fallen soldiers have been piled into a crater outside the front of the Stalin Museum, adjacent the station square. Snow covered trench lines from the September fighting are visible in the centre. The partially destroyed Nail Factory is concealed behind the museum on Gogolya Street at the junction with Kommunisticheskaya Street. Right, the tall building is the House of Communes, where the 1st Battalion also fought in.
From the 13th Guards Battle of Stalingrad daily diary, is the typed record of Lt Koleganov's report sent to Battalion Commander Fedoseyev on 20th September 1942, showing a hand written amendment to the 21st . The report was apparently amended under state party censorship and altered the profanities used in Koleganov's original report! Below is a translation of the report.
Time 11:30 September 20, 1942
To Guards Sr Lieutenant Fedoseyev (1st Battalion Commander)
I report that the situation is as follows: the enemy is trying to encircle my company, sending submachine gunners to the rear of the company, but all his attempts were unsuccessful, despite the superior forces at hand, our soldiers and commanders are showing courage and heroism over the fascist jackals.
While I stand the Fritzes will have no success. The Guards do not retreat, let the soldiers and commanders fall as braves, but the enemy must not pass our defense. Let the whole country know the 3rd Rifle Company, 13th Guards Division. While the company commander is alive, not a single whore will get through. It will only do so when the company commander is killed or seriously wounded. The 3rd Company Commander is in a difficult situation and physically unwell, weak and deafened. Dizziness occurs, he’s falling from his feet, his nose bleeds, but despite all the difficulties, the Guards of the 3rd and 2nd Companies won’t retreat, they will fall as heroes for the city of Stalin, may Soviet land be their grave. 3rd Company Commander Koleganov personally killed two Fritz machine-gunners and took the machine gun and documents that he presents to the headquarters of the battalion.
I rely on my soldiers and commanders, so far not a single fascist crossed. The vermin shall not pass. The Guardsmen do not regret, until complete victory we will be heroes of the liberation of Stalingrad.
Signed:
3rd Company Commander, Guards Snr. Lt Koleganov
2nd Company Commander, Guards Lt Kravtsov
To Guards Sr Lieutenant Fedoseyev (1st Battalion Commander)
I report that the situation is as follows: the enemy is trying to encircle my company, sending submachine gunners to the rear of the company, but all his attempts were unsuccessful, despite the superior forces at hand, our soldiers and commanders are showing courage and heroism over the fascist jackals.
While I stand the Fritzes will have no success. The Guards do not retreat, let the soldiers and commanders fall as braves, but the enemy must not pass our defense. Let the whole country know the 3rd Rifle Company, 13th Guards Division. While the company commander is alive, not a single whore will get through. It will only do so when the company commander is killed or seriously wounded. The 3rd Company Commander is in a difficult situation and physically unwell, weak and deafened. Dizziness occurs, he’s falling from his feet, his nose bleeds, but despite all the difficulties, the Guards of the 3rd and 2nd Companies won’t retreat, they will fall as heroes for the city of Stalin, may Soviet land be their grave. 3rd Company Commander Koleganov personally killed two Fritz machine-gunners and took the machine gun and documents that he presents to the headquarters of the battalion.
I rely on my soldiers and commanders, so far not a single fascist crossed. The vermin shall not pass. The Guardsmen do not regret, until complete victory we will be heroes of the liberation of Stalingrad.
Signed:
3rd Company Commander, Guards Snr. Lt Koleganov
2nd Company Commander, Guards Lt Kravtsov
Below are images showing the nature of fighting in the ruins of Stalingrad during the early period of the battle
Below are a series of images showing soldiers of the 62nd Army in Stalingrad. Amidst the almost continuous fighting there were rare opportunities of normality and events such as sharing a simple meal of kasha, a mug of tea, a joke or other everyday human interaction with their comrades was a great comfort to the troops, which also strengthened
moral and resolve to fight on!
The aerial image is of one of the many bunker 'villages' established by troops on the west bank of the Volga during the battle. This one is at the northern end of the city showing buildings of the factory district in the distant and the total devastation of the workers settlements.
moral and resolve to fight on!
The aerial image is of one of the many bunker 'villages' established by troops on the west bank of the Volga during the battle. This one is at the northern end of the city showing buildings of the factory district in the distant and the total devastation of the workers settlements.
Stalingrad.
Pavlov's House "The Lighthouse"
The House of Oblpotrebsoyuz , No. 61 Penzenskaya Street, was a four storey residential block of apartment dwellings situated on the south east end of the 9th January Square with Penzenskaya Street, which is situated about 200 meters west of the Volga, now known commonly as "Pavlov's House". Its strategic importance was its position adjacent the square, which gave a 1 Km all round view of the area. The story and the importance of Pavlov's House became one of the many myths which evolved during the course of the battle in the city and as a result of period and early post war Soviet propaganda official accounts which tended to exaggerate the facts, which now can be questioned post the Soviet era.
Prior to the taking of Pavlov's House, General Chuikov had ordered the use of 'storm group' tactics within the 62nd Army fighting in the city over conventional battalion and company attacks, which were proving to be ineffective with high casualty rates with little or no gain.The first such storm group operation was trialled on the 18th September and others ensued within the city. As a result, the Germans adopted new defensive tactics to counter the storm groups and not all such Soviet assaults were successful during the initial period.
On the night of 27th September, Junior Sergeant I.F. Pavlov was ordered by the 7th company commander, Snr. Lieutenant I.I. Naumov to conduct a scout patrol of the four-story building on 9th January Square, which stood adjacent to the ruins of “Zabolotny’s House”, which had been occupied the day before by Jr. Lieutenant Zabolotny's group. Under cover of darkness, Pavlov and his section managed to crawl undetected to an apparently undefended entrance. Leaving two of the section outside, Pavlov and three others entered and discovered Russian civilians in the building basement, who informed the soldiers of the whereabouts of the German occupiers located within the building. Bursting into the room, about 12 Germans soldiers were found to be drinking and playing cards and were duly dispatched by grenade and machine gun fire by Pavlov and his section and others were expelled from the building. Within a period of a couple of hours, the initial assault section in the house was reinforced and the defenders totalled 24 men, armed with an apparent array of heavy machine guns, submachine gun, automatic weapons, rifles and anti tank rifles, ammunition and supplies. Hereafter, the story of Pavlov's House evolves and becomes somewhat contradictory!
To be continued and updated soon!
The platoon Commander was wounded and Junior Sgt Yacob Pavlov led the defence of the house. The house was occupied by Pavlov and his men for 58 days, and withstood several infantry and tank attacks. The defenders were supplied via a communication trench dug from near the Volga and during it's occupation it was simply known to the Soviets known as " the house on Penzenskaya Street", or under the code name Маяк (Mayak) "The Lighthouse" by Army Order No.179, because of it exposed position protruding into the German positions. The defenders held out until 25th November when they were relieved by counter attacking Soviet forces. Pavlov is credited for personally destroying several enemy tanks and was later awarded The Gold Star and became a "Hero of the Soviet Union" on 27th June 1945 for his actions during the battle.
Afterwards, Chuikov the Commander of the 62nd Army is reported to have stated, that more German soldiers were killed trying to take Pavlov's house than that were killed during the German occupation of Paris in 1940!
Below: An aerial image showing 9th January Square with Dom Pavlova bottom right and Dom Zabolotny is on its left. The building was known as the House of Sovpartkontrol, and had been captured and defended by guardsmen of the 3rd battalion, 42nd Guards Rifle Regiment under command of Jr.Lieutenant N.E. Zabolotny. Digging a trench through Solnechnaya Street, they had managed to occupy the ruins of the four-story building without any casualties, as the Germans had not yet occupied the ruins, which in future was designated as "Zabolotny’s House." Due to German artillery barrages and assault gun attacks, almost the entire southern side of the building had collapsed and had buried some of its defenders under the rubble. Dom Pavlova survived partially demolished and was rebuilt after the war. Zabolotny and many of his garrison, together with most of the original defenders on "Pavlov's House" were later killed during the Soviet assault on the "Milk House" on the northwest side of 9th January Square on 24th-25th November.
Pavlov's House "The Lighthouse"
The House of Oblpotrebsoyuz , No. 61 Penzenskaya Street, was a four storey residential block of apartment dwellings situated on the south east end of the 9th January Square with Penzenskaya Street, which is situated about 200 meters west of the Volga, now known commonly as "Pavlov's House". Its strategic importance was its position adjacent the square, which gave a 1 Km all round view of the area. The story and the importance of Pavlov's House became one of the many myths which evolved during the course of the battle in the city and as a result of period and early post war Soviet propaganda official accounts which tended to exaggerate the facts, which now can be questioned post the Soviet era.
Prior to the taking of Pavlov's House, General Chuikov had ordered the use of 'storm group' tactics within the 62nd Army fighting in the city over conventional battalion and company attacks, which were proving to be ineffective with high casualty rates with little or no gain.The first such storm group operation was trialled on the 18th September and others ensued within the city. As a result, the Germans adopted new defensive tactics to counter the storm groups and not all such Soviet assaults were successful during the initial period.
On the night of 27th September, Junior Sergeant I.F. Pavlov was ordered by the 7th company commander, Snr. Lieutenant I.I. Naumov to conduct a scout patrol of the four-story building on 9th January Square, which stood adjacent to the ruins of “Zabolotny’s House”, which had been occupied the day before by Jr. Lieutenant Zabolotny's group. Under cover of darkness, Pavlov and his section managed to crawl undetected to an apparently undefended entrance. Leaving two of the section outside, Pavlov and three others entered and discovered Russian civilians in the building basement, who informed the soldiers of the whereabouts of the German occupiers located within the building. Bursting into the room, about 12 Germans soldiers were found to be drinking and playing cards and were duly dispatched by grenade and machine gun fire by Pavlov and his section and others were expelled from the building. Within a period of a couple of hours, the initial assault section in the house was reinforced and the defenders totalled 24 men, armed with an apparent array of heavy machine guns, submachine gun, automatic weapons, rifles and anti tank rifles, ammunition and supplies. Hereafter, the story of Pavlov's House evolves and becomes somewhat contradictory!
To be continued and updated soon!
The platoon Commander was wounded and Junior Sgt Yacob Pavlov led the defence of the house. The house was occupied by Pavlov and his men for 58 days, and withstood several infantry and tank attacks. The defenders were supplied via a communication trench dug from near the Volga and during it's occupation it was simply known to the Soviets known as " the house on Penzenskaya Street", or under the code name Маяк (Mayak) "The Lighthouse" by Army Order No.179, because of it exposed position protruding into the German positions. The defenders held out until 25th November when they were relieved by counter attacking Soviet forces. Pavlov is credited for personally destroying several enemy tanks and was later awarded The Gold Star and became a "Hero of the Soviet Union" on 27th June 1945 for his actions during the battle.
Afterwards, Chuikov the Commander of the 62nd Army is reported to have stated, that more German soldiers were killed trying to take Pavlov's house than that were killed during the German occupation of Paris in 1940!
Below: An aerial image showing 9th January Square with Dom Pavlova bottom right and Dom Zabolotny is on its left. The building was known as the House of Sovpartkontrol, and had been captured and defended by guardsmen of the 3rd battalion, 42nd Guards Rifle Regiment under command of Jr.Lieutenant N.E. Zabolotny. Digging a trench through Solnechnaya Street, they had managed to occupy the ruins of the four-story building without any casualties, as the Germans had not yet occupied the ruins, which in future was designated as "Zabolotny’s House." Due to German artillery barrages and assault gun attacks, almost the entire southern side of the building had collapsed and had buried some of its defenders under the rubble. Dom Pavlova survived partially demolished and was rebuilt after the war. Zabolotny and many of his garrison, together with most of the original defenders on "Pavlov's House" were later killed during the Soviet assault on the "Milk House" on the northwest side of 9th January Square on 24th-25th November.
Situation late September 1942, the 9th January Square, area of operations of the 3rd Battalion, 42nd Guards Regiment. Key buildings are shown as:
1. Station No. 1 where the Regiments 1st Battalion positions were located.
2. School No.6.
3. Ruins of the military building complex , known as the Voentorg. 4. Remains of the "House of Metalworkers".
5. House of Sovpartkontrol, known
"Zabolotny’s House".6. "House of Oblpotrebsoyuz", known as "Pavlov's House". Between No.5 & 6 can be seen the railway spur which went from the main line marshalling yards at the top of the image to "Grudinins Mill", which is just out of view at the bottom of the image.
The original citation for Sgt Pavlov's award for Hero of the Soviet Union.
Stalingrad.
Soviet infantry attack in the City.
By late September, early October German forces occupied most of the south and centre of the city, with pockets of Soviet defenders hanging on doggedly and also in the suburbs on the northern outskirts of the city.
Soviet Divisions that originally comprised of 10,000 men were down to 2,000 or less personnel. The watchword of the Division became " There is no land for us beyond the Volga", as the 62nd Army fought on in the city and as the weather worsened and winter began to set in.
On 27th September the German forces had reached the western edges of the Barrikady and Red October Factories in the north of the city. The same day, the Soviets had to abandon using the central ferry landing.
On the 1st October the 13th Guards was involved in the fighting near the Red October Factory and with two other divisions was forced back after sustaining heavy casualties.
Soviet Divisions that originally comprised of 10,000 men were down to 2,000 or less personnel. The watchword of the Division became " There is no land for us beyond the Volga", as the 62nd Army fought on in the city and as the weather worsened and winter began to set in.
On 27th September the German forces had reached the western edges of the Barrikady and Red October Factories in the north of the city. The same day, the Soviets had to abandon using the central ferry landing.
On the 1st October the 13th Guards was involved in the fighting near the Red October Factory and with two other divisions was forced back after sustaining heavy casualties.
By 30th September-1st October raiding groups of the German 295th Infantry Division had made rushed attacks along the Krutoy and Dolgiy gullies to reach the Volga, viewed as the most vulnerable place of the defence,which was the junction of Rodimtsev's 13th Guards and Batyuk's 284th Rifle Divisions intending to split the 62nd Army in two. These raids were unsuccessful and the gullies were left strewn with German dead. The Germans then decided to abandon the usual tactics of concentrated artillery and aerial bombardment followed by infantry clearing of the area and unusually opted for a surprise night attack via the Krutoy gully into the rear of the 13th Guards positions, planned for the night 1st-2nd October.
The night assault on the 13th Guards Rifle Division positions 1st-2nd October 1942, overlaying a period aerial photo. In addition to the main assault from the Krutoy gully, units of the German 295th Infantry Division attacked the positions of 3rd battalion, 39th Guards Rifle Regiment on Republican Street and one German battalion coming from the area of the “House of Railway Workers” aimed at the junction between 42nd Guards Rifle Regiment 3rd battalion and 34th Guards Rifle Regiment 2nd battalion. At the bottom right between the Krutoy and Dolgiy gullies on the Volga embankment is the location of the Division's HQ's, and showing the counterattack of Rodimtsev's "Zagradbat" blocking detachment reserves engaging infiltrating enemy forces. The 1043rd Rifle Regiment of Batyuk's 284th Rifle Division was located on the 13th Guards right flank, between the Krutoy and Dolgiy gullies. The 284th Division defences covered the Volga from here to the Mamaev Kurgan and the Red October factory areas.
At about 0130 hrs on 2nd October, over 300 soldiers of the German 518th Infantry Regiment and 635th Sapper Battalion of the 295th Infantry Division,had secretly crawled through the main drain pipe which ran the length of the Krutoy gully to the Volga, dragging mortars and flamethrowers with them. To coincide with this, the Germans launched frontal diversionary attacks on the 13th Guards positions from the west. Once clear of the main drain, a large force of Germans attacked south behind the 34th Regiment cutting it off from the Division. Another force attacked north towards the Divisional HQ's dugouts, which was supported by Rodimtsev's last reserves consisting of 30 soldiers of a "Zagradbat" blocking detachment. The Germans moving rapidly behind the Divisions positions seizing trench after trench as their sappers destroyed the dugouts of Soviet defenders. Also,Rodimtsev's HQ's had lost contact with the rest of the Division as the Germans had cut the field phone communication wires and hand-to-hand fighting was taking place near the HQ's dugouts. The ensuing close quarter grenade, submachine gun and hand to hand fighting lasted for several hours throughout the 13th Guards positions .
By 0500 hrs, a critical situation developed for 13th Guards as German assault groups were over running the defences of the 34th Guards Rifle Regiment and had attacked south rear of the now almost surrounded 39th and 42nd Guards Regiments.
Lieutenant A.T. Stroganov, commander of the reserve blocking detachment was ordered to drive out the Germans from the positions of 34th Guards Rifle Regiment in the area north of the mouth of the Krutoy gully. Gathering up withdrawing soldiers of the overrun 34th Regiments 3rd Battalion positions, the lieutenant led a counterattack on the Germans breaking through to the Division HQ's and a skirmish ensued in the warehouses and on piers and the railway on the embankments, where the Germans were halted and could not go further.
By 0600 hrs having gathering up all possible reserves, the 13th Guards was able to develope the counterattack against the German units within the Divisions positions. As the German assault wavered and units began to retreat back to the Krutoy gully they were caught in pursuing Soviet crossfire and ambushes. Also at that time the Division HQ's was finally able to make contact with the artillery batteries on the east bank of the Volga, where large calibre shell fire was directed into the area of the Krutoy ravine where German reinforcements and the retreating units were located.
Within just 30 minutes the attacking German forces had been destroyed leaving hundreds dead and the Divisions defensive situation had been restored,which took two days for the 13th Guards to fully consolidate.The 34th Guards Rifle Regiment of the Division alone suffered irrecoverable losses, reporting 95 soldiers missing and 213 killed during the night attack of 1st-2nd October! According to Soviet field reports, amongst the hundreds of Germans killed participating in the night attack, some were wearing the insignia of paratroopers, veterans of the landing on Crete of May 1941. It was also reported that some of the German soldiers were wearing Red Army uniforms!
After the unsuccessful night attack the Germans no longer conducted such large-scale offensives against 13th Guards Rifle Division positions. During the ensuing struggle for this compact section of the city centre both the Germans and Soviets began to limiting themselves only to local skirmishes using storm group tactics. German small scale assaults were directed at Soviet strongholds, usually established within individual brick or concrete built buildings, which had been additionally fortified incorporating all around defence and also with mutual supporting fire from other nearby Soviet strongholds, and were expected to serve as centres of resistance even if encircled. The character of the fighting had changed where the opponents exchanged artillery and mortar shells and the numbers of those killed by sniper fire increased sharply!
On the 3rd October the Division beat off a number of German attacks on its positions. Subsequently there was a lull in the fighting in the city centre as the Soviets consolidated their positions and Germans switched the emphasis to the Factory district. On the 28th October the Division also took part in the fighting on the Mamaev Kurgan, which beat off German assaults both on and the south of the hill.
Throughout October and November, the Germans in a last desperate attempt to capture the whole of the city, launched several assaults against the Soviet forces in the Factory district and the remaining pockets in the city, where the Division continued to hold on as the River Volga began to freeze over. By late October the Germans occupied nine tenths of the city.
Soviet Armies north and south of the city mounted counter attacks to relieve the desperate 62nd Army fighting in the city.
On 7th November in Stalin's Order of the Day, the words of a popular saying were used, " There will be a holiday in our street soon", a forewarning of a coming offensive.
On the 19th November the Armies of the Southwestern and Don Fronts attacked the German 6th Army from the north west of Stalingrad. The following day, the Stalingrad Front attacked from the south of the city. By the 23rd the Soviet armies had met up at Kalach and the 6th Army was surrounded, in what became known as "The Kessel ", which signalled the destruction of German forces at Stalingrad. During December the 13th Guards recaptured the German strongholds of the "House of Railway Workers", the "L Shaped House" and the "House of Specialists".
The subsequent Soviet operations during November, December and January eventually forced the remnants of the German 6th Army eastward into the ruined city.
At 0920 hrs on 26th January 1943 near the Red October factory settlement, Guardsmen of the 13th Guards met up with attacking Soviet forces from the west, thus splitting the German forces into a northern and a southern group.
On 31st January the German southern group capitulated and the commander of the 6th Army, Field Marshal von Paulus was captured. On the 2nd February in the Tractor and Barrikady factories and settlements the German northern group was finally destroyed. Sporadic fighting continued well into February as isolated pockets of German resistance continued in underground cellars, bunkers and the sewers throughout the city.
The Battle of Stalingrad was a defining episode in the history of the 13th Guards, however it was probably it's most costliest in it's history. Of the original 10,000 or so troops of the Division who crossed the Volga on 14th September 1942, only between 280 - 320 are reported to have survived the battle.
Mural painting and diorama of the fighting in Stalingrad, taken at the Central Army Museum, Moscow during a visit in 2006. The red brick building in the centre is the southern gable end of " Gerhardt's Mill" and to the left, in the far distance is the red brick four storey building known as "Pavlov's House" . The 13th Guards fought at both buildings. Note: the female medic tending the wounded soldier assisted by a young boy.
Below are images showing the nature of fighting in the ruins of Stalingrad during the winter period of the battle.
End of the Battle of Stalingrad. This famous image was taken from the roof of the old Gorki theatre, overlooking the Square of the Fallen Heroes and the memorial to the Battle of Tsaritsyn during the Russian Civil War in 1918. The building partially obscured behind the red flag is the Univermag, the HQ's of Field Marshall von Paulus, commander of the German 6th Army. The building immediately on the right was occupied by the 13th Guards, which today is the Volgograd Hotel in modern day Volgograd.
From right to left: members of the Council of the Armed Forces of the Stalingrad Front N.S. Khrushchev, generals A.I. Rodimtsev, M.S. Shumilov, V.I. Chuikov and member of the Military Council of the Stalingrad Front, General K.A, Gurov. The tall figure behind Rodimtsev appears to be that of General K.K Rokossovsky, Commander of the Don Front, Stalingrad, 4 February 1943
The remains of Stalingrad Mill No.4, known as Grudinins Mill, in modern day Volgograd, left as a memorial to the Battle of Stalingrad. The image is of the northern gable end of the mill taken during a visit in 2006. The building in the background and partially obscured right of the mill is "Pavlov's House" rebuilt after the battle by local women survivors and German POWs. Previously known as "Gerhardt's Mill, the Russian transcription of the German name, which can still be seen on the original brickwork on the gable ends of the mill. The steam powered mill was constructed in 1903 for Volga German owner Alexander Gerhardt.The mill was renamed in honour of K. Grudinin, member and Secretary of the local Communist Party, and mill worker who was shot and killed in 1922, despite the renaming, the inhabitants of the city still called the mill by the name of its founder. During the battle it was captured and defended by soldiers of the 42nd Guards Rifle Regiment, 13th Guards Rifle Division.
"Rodimtsev's Wall", situated on the Volga embankment behind the the Stalingrad Panorama Museum and Gerhardt's Mill and is the site of the 13th Guards defences during the battle. The inscription translates as "The soldiers of General Rodimtsev's Guards unit fought here to the death. By holding out, we triumphed over death."
In Volgograd there is a memorial which commemorates the 30-kilometre long defence line of the 62nd Army which passes through several parts of the city. The memorial comprises of seventeen T34 tank turrets each mounted onto pedestals. They stand on the front line as they did on 19 November 1942, when the advancement of German troops on the Volga River reached its peak. The idea to immortalize the Stalingrad front line came about in the second half of the 1940s and construction was completed in 1954.
Turret No.1, stands in a square just off Chuikova Street, near house No. 33, on the embankment on the spot where the Volga is only 100 metres away. It was here in the autumn of 1942 that the position was held by the 13th Guards Rifle Division. A nearby street is named after the Division next to the Stalingrad Panorama Museum. Under the command of General Aleksandr Rodimtsev the Division held many significant locations including nearby Pavlov's House and Grudinin's Mill.
Turret No.1, stands in a square just off Chuikova Street, near house No. 33, on the embankment on the spot where the Volga is only 100 metres away. It was here in the autumn of 1942 that the position was held by the 13th Guards Rifle Division. A nearby street is named after the Division next to the Stalingrad Panorama Museum. Under the command of General Aleksandr Rodimtsev the Division held many significant locations including nearby Pavlov's House and Grudinin's Mill.
"Rodina Mat"
"Mother Russia" at Volgograd.
The Mother Russian Statue at Volgograd. Standing at 279 feet tall,
atop the Mamaev Kurgan. The "Rodina Mat" or Mother Russia statue
is a memorial to all the Soviets that died during the 200 day battle
for Stalingrad, which is now modern day Volgograd. The statue was completed and dedicated in 1967 and at that time it was the worlds tallest free standing statue.
The Order of the Red Banner.
For courage and bravery and the exemplary fulfillment of the combat assignments and successful military operations in the defence of Stalingrad, by the decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR of 31st March 1943, the Division was awarded the Order of Lenin in October of that year.
Instituted on 16th September 1918 during the Russian Civil War as a military award. Later a civil award was founded for scientific, technical, manufacturing and agricultural achievements. Until the Order of Lenin was instituted in 1930, the Order of the Red Banner was the highest award. The order was awarded to individuals and units only for acts of extreme heroism or other extraordinary accomplishments of valour during combat operations. Units awarded the Order adopted the "Order of the Red Banner" in their respective unit titles.
For courage and bravery and the exemplary fulfillment of the combat assignments and successful military operations in the defence of Stalingrad, by the decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR of 31st March 1943, the Division was awarded the Order of Lenin in October of that year.
Instituted on 16th September 1918 during the Russian Civil War as a military award. Later a civil award was founded for scientific, technical, manufacturing and agricultural achievements. Until the Order of Lenin was instituted in 1930, the Order of the Red Banner was the highest award. The order was awarded to individuals and units only for acts of extreme heroism or other extraordinary accomplishments of valour during combat operations. Units awarded the Order adopted the "Order of the Red Banner" in their respective unit titles.
Post Stalingrad.
Following the Battle of Stalingrad the Soviet 62nd Army was re designated the 8th Guards Army in April 1943. Also, in April a Reserve Army was formed in the Voronezh region and named the Steppe Military District.
In July 1943 it was renamed as the Steppe Front (became 2nd Ukrainian Front from October 1943) and included a number of units which had taken part in the battles for Leningrad and Stalingrad that were withdrawn in support of the impending Kursk operations. The Front was commanded by Col. General Konev.
The 13th Guards were withdrawn as a field unit on 5th February 1943 for refit and resupply after Stalingrad. The Division remained in the area of Krasnaya Sloboda on the east bank of the Volga until 6th April, thereafter, via Saratov, Rtishchevo and Povarina it arrived at Talovaya, southeast of Voronezh on 16th April, where it became part of the Steppe Military District Army Reserve. The Division was reformed as part of the 32nd Guards Rifle Corps,which was commanded by Maj. General Rodimtsev from 17th April 1943 to May 1946. The Corps as part of the 5th Guards Army became part of the Steppe Front Reserve Forces, later the Steppe Front, when the Division was committed to combat on 12th July during the Battle of Kursk. The 13th Guards were now commanded by Maj. General G.V Baklanov.
The above image shows General Rodimtsev, wearing side cap, with 13th Guardsmen at Stalingrad. The young soldier on the far right is believed to be sniper Anatoly Chekhov, aged 19 years. Chekhov is accredited with 256 confirmed 'kills' during the battle and personally received the Order of the Red Banner from Rodimtsev. In 1943, near Kiev, Chekhov was seriously wounded and was invalided out of the army. He subsequently recovered and undertook war work as a gas welder.
In July 1943 it was renamed as the Steppe Front (became 2nd Ukrainian Front from October 1943) and included a number of units which had taken part in the battles for Leningrad and Stalingrad that were withdrawn in support of the impending Kursk operations. The Front was commanded by Col. General Konev.
The 13th Guards were withdrawn as a field unit on 5th February 1943 for refit and resupply after Stalingrad. The Division remained in the area of Krasnaya Sloboda on the east bank of the Volga until 6th April, thereafter, via Saratov, Rtishchevo and Povarina it arrived at Talovaya, southeast of Voronezh on 16th April, where it became part of the Steppe Military District Army Reserve. The Division was reformed as part of the 32nd Guards Rifle Corps,which was commanded by Maj. General Rodimtsev from 17th April 1943 to May 1946. The Corps as part of the 5th Guards Army became part of the Steppe Front Reserve Forces, later the Steppe Front, when the Division was committed to combat on 12th July during the Battle of Kursk. The 13th Guards were now commanded by Maj. General G.V Baklanov.
The above image shows General Rodimtsev, wearing side cap, with 13th Guardsmen at Stalingrad. The young soldier on the far right is believed to be sniper Anatoly Chekhov, aged 19 years. Chekhov is accredited with 256 confirmed 'kills' during the battle and personally received the Order of the Red Banner from Rodimtsev. In 1943, near Kiev, Chekhov was seriously wounded and was invalided out of the army. He subsequently recovered and undertook war work as a gas welder.
1943.
Major General Gleb Vladimirovich Baklanov.
Formerly Commanding Officer of 299th Rifle Division, was Commander of the 13th Guards Rifle Division on two occasions during the war, namely 5th May - 15th December 1943 and 16th February - 29th September 1944, where upon he became Commander of the 34th Guards Rifle Corps, 5th Guards Army, remaining in command until 20th March 1947. During the Berlin Offensive, the Corps took part in the Neisse, Spree and Elbe River operations and was present at the first meeting of US forces near Torgau in April 1945. During the subsequent Prague Offensive,
for his heroism and skilled leadership of troops in the battle for Dresden General Baklanov was awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union on 29th May.
He commanded the combined forces representing the 1st Ukrainian Front during the Moscow Victory Parade on 26th June 1945.
Formerly Commanding Officer of 299th Rifle Division, was Commander of the 13th Guards Rifle Division on two occasions during the war, namely 5th May - 15th December 1943 and 16th February - 29th September 1944, where upon he became Commander of the 34th Guards Rifle Corps, 5th Guards Army, remaining in command until 20th March 1947. During the Berlin Offensive, the Corps took part in the Neisse, Spree and Elbe River operations and was present at the first meeting of US forces near Torgau in April 1945. During the subsequent Prague Offensive,
for his heroism and skilled leadership of troops in the battle for Dresden General Baklanov was awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union on 29th May.
He commanded the combined forces representing the 1st Ukrainian Front during the Moscow Victory Parade on 26th June 1945.
5th Guards Army.
Gen. A.S Zhadov.
The 5th Guards Army was initially born from the 66th Army, which had taken part in the operations in September and October 1942 to break through to the Volga north of Stalingrad and during the inner encirclement of German forces in the city had linked up with the 62nd Army. For theses actions, formally on 16th April 1943, Order no. 41620 of the HQ's of the Supreme Command, the 66th Army was reorganised as the 5th Guards Army, which included other divisions who had distinguished combat service at Stalingrad. Post Stalingrad, the composite divisions had been withdrawn and were replenished and resupplied, which had taken place during February to April that year. In April, the new 5th Guards Army had been redeployed to Bobrov, which is about 320 km south east of Kursk and 100 km south of Voronezh, where it became part of the Steppe Military District, later the Steppe Reserve Front.
The 5th Guards Army was commanded by Col.General Alexei Semenovich Zhadov between 16/4/1943-21/7/1946, who had previously commanded the 66th Army between 14.10.1942 –16.04.1943.
The subordinate units with the 5th Guards Army order of battle at Kursk were as follows:
42nd Guards Rifle Division.
10th Tank Corps.
32nd Guards Rifle Corp consisting: 6th Guards Airborne, 13th Guards and 66th Guards Rifle Divisions.
33rd Guards Rifle Corp consisting: 9th Guards Airborne, 95th Guards and 97th Guards Rifle Divisions.
308th Guards Rocket Artillery Regt. (Katusha's)
256th & 431st Engineer Battalions.
301st & 1322nd Anti Tank Regt.
29th Anti Aircraft Div.
Following Kursk the 5th Guards Army was involved in the following operations:
Dniepr crossing, Lvov Sandormiez, Vistula-Oder, Berlin and Prague Offensives respectively. It was soldiers of the 5th Guards Army who met up with soldiers of the US 1st Army at Torgau on the River Elbe on 26th April 1945
The 5th Guards Army was commanded by Col.General Alexei Semenovich Zhadov between 16/4/1943-21/7/1946, who had previously commanded the 66th Army between 14.10.1942 –16.04.1943.
The subordinate units with the 5th Guards Army order of battle at Kursk were as follows:
42nd Guards Rifle Division.
10th Tank Corps.
32nd Guards Rifle Corp consisting: 6th Guards Airborne, 13th Guards and 66th Guards Rifle Divisions.
33rd Guards Rifle Corp consisting: 9th Guards Airborne, 95th Guards and 97th Guards Rifle Divisions.
308th Guards Rocket Artillery Regt. (Katusha's)
256th & 431st Engineer Battalions.
301st & 1322nd Anti Tank Regt.
29th Anti Aircraft Div.
Following Kursk the 5th Guards Army was involved in the following operations:
Dniepr crossing, Lvov Sandormiez, Vistula-Oder, Berlin and Prague Offensives respectively. It was soldiers of the 5th Guards Army who met up with soldiers of the US 1st Army at Torgau on the River Elbe on 26th April 1945
Battle of Kursk and the Soviet counter offensives 1943.
Kursk 5th July 1943.
Soviet machine gun and anti tank rifle positions at Kursk.
On the eve of the Battle of Kursk the 13th Guards was part of the 5th Guards Army, Steppe Reserve Front, and was now situated about 40 km east of the front line at the rear of the 69th Army.
The Germans intentions for Operation Citadel was to pinch out the Kursk Salient which was created by the Soviets during their spring 1943 offensives, following the fall of Stalingrad. The salient was about 200 km wide and 150 km deep, centred around the important railway centre of Kursk. If successful the Germans would shorten their front and release vital needed Divisions for elsewhere on the Front. Also, the Germans believed that the Soviets could use the salient for a "jumping off point" for their summer offensives, which could threaten and isolate German forces in the Caucasus and Crimea.
The Battle of Kursk is primarily remembered for the tank battles, the largest in military history. However, there were other important aspects to the battle. In the weeks preceding the battle there were hundreds of operations conducted behind the German lines by Partisan units, which hugely disrupted the German preparations. Particularly, communications, supply and the railway net work were attacked and hundreds of locomotives, carriages and large amounts of materiel was destroyed or damaged.
The vast majority of the Soviet forces were infantrymen who manned the defensive lines alongside the artillery and anti tank gunners. Also, overhead huge air battles raged, which included the largest single loss of aircraft in one single day during the entire Second World War.
Intelligence from the "Lucy Ring" espionage network operating in Switzerland and reporting directly to Moscow, had alerted the Soviets of the German intentions at Kursk as early as April 1943, together with intelligence from Britain's "Ultra" interceptions of German radio traffic.
The Soviets in anticipation of the German operation had prepared a series of eight defensive lines stretching over 200 km behind their front. It was manned by around 1,900,000 troops, supported by 25,000 artillery, anti tank and mortar pieces, totalling about 75 Divisions. They had amassed over 3,000 tanks and armoured fighting vehicles in the salient and another 1500 in Koviev's Steppe Reserve Front.
The Soviets also had around 3,000 supporting aircraft, many of which were of a faster and modern design not previously encountered on the Eastern Front by the Germans. The defensive lines were carefully prepared with artillery and anti tank zones and interlinked by massive mine fields. The Soviet plan was to redirect and slow the German advance and to gradually wear down the powerful panzer armies.
Thereafter, the Soviets using their Reserve Armies would immediately mount counter offensives at the end of July. The Steppe Reserve Army was initially intended to be used in the counter offensives, the 5th Guards Army in " Operation Rumyantsev". However, on the first day of the battle when the German Panzer Armies started to punch their way through the Soviet lines, the Steppe Reserve was immediately committed to the battle to block the advancing German forces.
The Germans intentions for Operation Citadel was to pinch out the Kursk Salient which was created by the Soviets during their spring 1943 offensives, following the fall of Stalingrad. The salient was about 200 km wide and 150 km deep, centred around the important railway centre of Kursk. If successful the Germans would shorten their front and release vital needed Divisions for elsewhere on the Front. Also, the Germans believed that the Soviets could use the salient for a "jumping off point" for their summer offensives, which could threaten and isolate German forces in the Caucasus and Crimea.
The Battle of Kursk is primarily remembered for the tank battles, the largest in military history. However, there were other important aspects to the battle. In the weeks preceding the battle there were hundreds of operations conducted behind the German lines by Partisan units, which hugely disrupted the German preparations. Particularly, communications, supply and the railway net work were attacked and hundreds of locomotives, carriages and large amounts of materiel was destroyed or damaged.
The vast majority of the Soviet forces were infantrymen who manned the defensive lines alongside the artillery and anti tank gunners. Also, overhead huge air battles raged, which included the largest single loss of aircraft in one single day during the entire Second World War.
Intelligence from the "Lucy Ring" espionage network operating in Switzerland and reporting directly to Moscow, had alerted the Soviets of the German intentions at Kursk as early as April 1943, together with intelligence from Britain's "Ultra" interceptions of German radio traffic.
The Soviets in anticipation of the German operation had prepared a series of eight defensive lines stretching over 200 km behind their front. It was manned by around 1,900,000 troops, supported by 25,000 artillery, anti tank and mortar pieces, totalling about 75 Divisions. They had amassed over 3,000 tanks and armoured fighting vehicles in the salient and another 1500 in Koviev's Steppe Reserve Front.
The Soviets also had around 3,000 supporting aircraft, many of which were of a faster and modern design not previously encountered on the Eastern Front by the Germans. The defensive lines were carefully prepared with artillery and anti tank zones and interlinked by massive mine fields. The Soviet plan was to redirect and slow the German advance and to gradually wear down the powerful panzer armies.
Thereafter, the Soviets using their Reserve Armies would immediately mount counter offensives at the end of July. The Steppe Reserve Army was initially intended to be used in the counter offensives, the 5th Guards Army in " Operation Rumyantsev". However, on the first day of the battle when the German Panzer Armies started to punch their way through the Soviet lines, the Steppe Reserve was immediately committed to the battle to block the advancing German forces.
Operation Citadel.
German armour moves forward in the Kursk area.
Operation Citadel was the German codename for the Kursk Salient theatre of operations to be launched on the 5th July 1943.
The Germans had amassed almost fifty Army and Waffen SS Division's, 2,000 tanks, 1,000 assault guns and supported by 1,800 aircraft. Hitler had expected a lightning armoured offensive, which would punch their way through on their respective fronts and encircle huge numbers of Soviet forces within the salient, as they had done so in the campaigns of the previous years. However, Hitler and his Generals had greatly underestimated the strength and depth of the Soviet forces in and around the salient.
On the eve of the operation a German deserter gave the Soviets the date and time of the attack. With this information the Soviets launched a huge pre-emptive artillery bombardment on the German forces as they were in their forming up positions just before they were due to attack. The bombardment signalled the start of the Battle of Kursk, which became a huge, sprawling, fragmented series of battles spread over an area roughly half the size of England and which was worsened by the onset of heavy rains which turned the cornfields and steppe into a morass of mud.
In the north the Germans attacked southward under von Kluge's Army Group Centre, spearheaded by Model's Ninth Army and supported in the air by Luftflotte 6. A simultaneous attack in the south would strike northward by von Manstein's Army Group South, spearheaded by 1,200 tanks of Hoths Fourth Panzer Army and supported in the air by Luftflotte 4.
In the northern part of the salient German progress was slow, penetrating only 10km on the first day and after four days some panzer units were only 19km into Soviet lines, which was as far as some units ever got during the whole battle and at huge losses to the Germans.
In the southern part of the salient Hoths panzers made marginally more impact into the Soviet lines on the first day, sufficient for Stalin to intervene and order more Soviet forces into that area. As the battles in the southern part of the salient progressed and the Germans continued their advance through the Soviet defensive belts, casualties and tank losses on both sides were mounting.
On the 8th July, Zhadov's 5th Guards Army of some 80,000 troops was transferred from the Steppe Front Reserve to the Voronezh Front. Moving by night on 8 & 9th July, the 5th Guards advanced some 70 miles (112 km) up to the River Psel taking up defensive positions on a 20 mile (32 km) sector running between Oboyan and Prokhorovka and was to be in full defensive readiness by the morning of the 11th July.
Also,General Pavel Rotmistrov's uncommitted 5th Guards Tank Army had made the 100 km drive, arriving east of Prokhorovka. By late evening 11th July it occupied assembly areas at the rear of the 5th Guards Army west of Prokhorovka. The 13th Guards took up positions west of Prokhorovka near the Oboyan - Belgorod road with the 32nd Guards Rifle Corps.
The Germans had amassed almost fifty Army and Waffen SS Division's, 2,000 tanks, 1,000 assault guns and supported by 1,800 aircraft. Hitler had expected a lightning armoured offensive, which would punch their way through on their respective fronts and encircle huge numbers of Soviet forces within the salient, as they had done so in the campaigns of the previous years. However, Hitler and his Generals had greatly underestimated the strength and depth of the Soviet forces in and around the salient.
On the eve of the operation a German deserter gave the Soviets the date and time of the attack. With this information the Soviets launched a huge pre-emptive artillery bombardment on the German forces as they were in their forming up positions just before they were due to attack. The bombardment signalled the start of the Battle of Kursk, which became a huge, sprawling, fragmented series of battles spread over an area roughly half the size of England and which was worsened by the onset of heavy rains which turned the cornfields and steppe into a morass of mud.
In the north the Germans attacked southward under von Kluge's Army Group Centre, spearheaded by Model's Ninth Army and supported in the air by Luftflotte 6. A simultaneous attack in the south would strike northward by von Manstein's Army Group South, spearheaded by 1,200 tanks of Hoths Fourth Panzer Army and supported in the air by Luftflotte 4.
In the northern part of the salient German progress was slow, penetrating only 10km on the first day and after four days some panzer units were only 19km into Soviet lines, which was as far as some units ever got during the whole battle and at huge losses to the Germans.
In the southern part of the salient Hoths panzers made marginally more impact into the Soviet lines on the first day, sufficient for Stalin to intervene and order more Soviet forces into that area. As the battles in the southern part of the salient progressed and the Germans continued their advance through the Soviet defensive belts, casualties and tank losses on both sides were mounting.
On the 8th July, Zhadov's 5th Guards Army of some 80,000 troops was transferred from the Steppe Front Reserve to the Voronezh Front. Moving by night on 8 & 9th July, the 5th Guards advanced some 70 miles (112 km) up to the River Psel taking up defensive positions on a 20 mile (32 km) sector running between Oboyan and Prokhorovka and was to be in full defensive readiness by the morning of the 11th July.
Also,General Pavel Rotmistrov's uncommitted 5th Guards Tank Army had made the 100 km drive, arriving east of Prokhorovka. By late evening 11th July it occupied assembly areas at the rear of the 5th Guards Army west of Prokhorovka. The 13th Guards took up positions west of Prokhorovka near the Oboyan - Belgorod road with the 32nd Guards Rifle Corps.
A Soviet schematic map of the situation on the 11th July 1943 and proposed operations on the eve of the great tank battle at Prokhorovka.
The 13th Guards are positioned between the Psel River and the main Oboyan- Belgorod road, west of Prokhorovka and facing the 11th Panzer Division, junction with the Grossdeutschland Division. At 0830hrs on the 12th July, the 13th Guards as part of the 32nd Guards Rifle Corps attacked south from Kotschetovka towards Gresnoe supported by forty to fifty tanks. Some of the units managed to penetrate the defensive positions protecting the northern flanks of the 2nd SS Panzer units attacking towards the town of Prokhorovka. The 2nd SS Panzer Division intentions were then to swing north west and and take the town of Oboyan, supported by the Grossdeuschland and 11th Panzer Divisions who would drive due north to the same objective.
The aftermath of the Battle of Kursk.
On the 10th of July, Hitler was informed of the Anglo-American invasion of Sicily, Operation Husky. He became concerned of the potential of Italy's collapse and the impact it would have also in the Balkan's. He needed to consider badly needed reinforcements for Italy and the withdrawal of units from the Eastern Front. However, he was sufficiently satisfied with the progress of Op. Citadel at this time and decided not to cancel it.
The 2nd SS Panxer Corps was still advancing slowly towards its objectives, with SS Leibstandarte in the centre, SS Totenkopf on its left flank and SS Das Reich on its right flank. SS Leibstandarte's armour was punching a wedge into the Soviet defences in front of Prokhorovka. Units on both opposing sides had been in almost constant combat for a week of infanty, tank, artillery and aerial battles.
On the early hours of the 12th of July the 1st and 5th Guards Tank Armies launched their attacks, which resulted in the tank battles of Prokhorovka. However, this aspect of the campaign is not included here, as the tank battle as such detracts
from Division's actual sphere of combat. The famous tank battles and subsequent and often disputed losses of tanks and troops on both sides are numerously recorded elsewhere for the interested reader. Also, on the 12th July, the Bryansk Front launched Operation Kutuzov, attacking the nose and southern flanks of the northern part of the salient. Following the two day "armoured clash" at Prokhorovka, the Germans mounted counter strike operations, some of which were successful. However, by the 17th of July Hitler had authorised the cancellation of Op. Citadel and the German forces began to withdraw to their original start lines for the Kursk operations and others were withdrawn to Italy during late July. During the counter attacks the Division retook Kochetovka and Gresnoe, south west of Prokhorovka from the retreating Germans defensive operations.
Although the Soviets had previously mounted successful winter counter strikes against the Germans, Kursk and it's ensuing counter attack operations were their first successful summer campaigns and signalled the start of the German retreat westwards from which they would never be able to repeat the victories of previous years.
The 2nd SS Panxer Corps was still advancing slowly towards its objectives, with SS Leibstandarte in the centre, SS Totenkopf on its left flank and SS Das Reich on its right flank. SS Leibstandarte's armour was punching a wedge into the Soviet defences in front of Prokhorovka. Units on both opposing sides had been in almost constant combat for a week of infanty, tank, artillery and aerial battles.
On the early hours of the 12th of July the 1st and 5th Guards Tank Armies launched their attacks, which resulted in the tank battles of Prokhorovka. However, this aspect of the campaign is not included here, as the tank battle as such detracts
from Division's actual sphere of combat. The famous tank battles and subsequent and often disputed losses of tanks and troops on both sides are numerously recorded elsewhere for the interested reader. Also, on the 12th July, the Bryansk Front launched Operation Kutuzov, attacking the nose and southern flanks of the northern part of the salient. Following the two day "armoured clash" at Prokhorovka, the Germans mounted counter strike operations, some of which were successful. However, by the 17th of July Hitler had authorised the cancellation of Op. Citadel and the German forces began to withdraw to their original start lines for the Kursk operations and others were withdrawn to Italy during late July. During the counter attacks the Division retook Kochetovka and Gresnoe, south west of Prokhorovka from the retreating Germans defensive operations.
Although the Soviets had previously mounted successful winter counter strikes against the Germans, Kursk and it's ensuing counter attack operations were their first successful summer campaigns and signalled the start of the German retreat westwards from which they would never be able to repeat the victories of previous years.
Operation Polkovodets Rumyantsev, 3rd August 1943.
Russian schematic map, showing operations of the 32nd Guards Rifle Corps, and the 13th Guards. Belgorod's north west outskirts are about 12km east of the bottom right corner of this map.
Operation Polkovodets Rumyantsev (named after the famous Russian 18th century Commander Peter Rumyanstev)
The planned Soviet counter offensive following the initial Kursk operation was to be originally launched on the 23rd July 1943. However, the reserve units dedicated to this operation had to be committed to the main Kursk defensive operations and subsequently the operation was delayed.
Following the Kursk defensive stages the Western, Bryansk and Central Front would attack the Germans in the north of the salient towards Orel on German Army Group Centre, Operation Kutuzov 12th July - 18th August 1943.
In the southern salient the Voronezh and Steppe Fronts would attack the 4th Panzer Army and Army Group Kempf of the northern flanks of Army Group South and towards Belgorod and open the route to Kharkov, Operation Polkovodets Rumyantsev 3rd - 23rd August 1943. When launched on the 3rd August the Germans were taken by surprise as they had believed the Soviets, like themselves were still recovering from the losses at Kursk and would not be able to mount a large scale counter offensive so early after the Kursk battles. For the Belgorod - Kharkov operations the Soviets amassed about 900,000 men and 2,800 tanks. The German forces facing them were about 300,000 men and 560 tanks.
The Division, as part of the 5th Guards Army had a pivotal role in the operations to retake Belgorod and after Kursk the 5th Guards Army strength was reinforced to around 85,000 men and 70 tanks. The Divisions starting point was south of Pokrovka and it took part in the Yakovlevo - Tomarovka areas, about 25 km north west of Belgorod. By the end of the first day the Division had advanced 6-8 km into the German defensive positions and after the initial gains, elements of the 1st Guards Tank Army drove on through the Divisions positions and continued the attack and the Division met stubborn German defenses in the Tomarovka/Domnen areas by the 19th Panzer Division. A 40 km gap had opened between the German 4th Panzer Army and Army Group Kempf and with the Soviet forces driving on Graivoron from the south west, German divisions pulling out the Tomarovka area had only one road open to them south via Borisovka, Golovchino to Graivoron. The retreating German columns were subjected to heavy Soviet artillery and air attacks, destroying around 50 tanks and General Schmidt commander of the 19th Panzer Division was killed. To intercept the German columns, the 13th Guards rushed a tank supported battalion to Golovchino, where 24 hours later the German units were destroyed by the 6th Guards who had entered Borisovka and the 13th Guards at Golovchino.
By the 5-6th August the Soviets had retaken both Belgorod and Orel in the north. The Germans were forced to withdraw to the south west of Belgorod and defend against the Soviet advance to Kharkov, about 80 km to the south, by the Voronezh and Steppe Fronts.
In Tomarovka there is a street named '32nd Guards Corps' in honour of the unit that liberated it in 1943.
Orders of the Day on the Red Army's Victories, July 24 - September 25,1943
Order of the Day, July 24, 1943
Issued by Marshal Stalin and addressed to Army-General Rokossovsky, Army-General Valutin and Colonel-General Popov
Yesterday, on July 23, as the result of the successful operations of our troops, the complete liquidation of the German July offensive was accomplished in the areas south of Orel and north of Byelgorod in the direction of Kursk.
On the morning of July 5 the German-fascist troops, with large forces of tanks and infantry, supported by large air forces, passed to the offensive in the Orel-Kursk and Byelgorod-Kursk directions. The Germans hurled into attack against our troops their main forces, concentrated in the areas of Orel and Byelgorod.
As is now clear, the German Command sent into action: in the Orel-Kursk direction—seven tank, two motorized and eleven infantry divisions; and in the Byelgorod-Kursk direction—ten tank, one motorized and seven infantry divisions. Thus altogether the enemy hurled into attack seventeen tank, three motorized and eighteen German infantry divisions.
Concentrating these forces on narrow sectors of the front, the German Command reckoned, by concentric blows from the north and from the south in the general direction towards Kursk, on piercing our defences, and on encircling and wiping out our troops stationed along the arc of the Kursk salient.
This new German offensive did not take our troops unawares. They were prepared not only to repulse the German offensive, but also to deal mighty counter-blows. At the cost of tremendous losses in man-power and equipment, the enemy succeeded in driving a wedge into our defences to a depth of about nine kilometres (six miles) in the Orel-Kursk direction and of 15 to 35 kilometres in the Byelgorod-Kursk direction.
In fierce engagements our troops wore down and bled white the picked German divisions, and followed this up by violent counterblows by which they not only hurled back the enemy and completely restored the position they had occupied before July 5, but also broke through the enemy’s defences and advanced 15 to 25 kilometres towards Orel.
The battles fought for the liquidation of the German offensive have demonstrated the high military skill of our troops. Unprecedented examples of stubbornness, steadfastness and heroism have been displayed by the men and commanders of all arms, including artillery and mortar gunners, tankmen and airmen.
Thus, the German plan for a summer offensive can be considered as having failed completely. Thus the legend that in a summer offensive the Germans are always successful, and that the Soviet troops are compelled to retreat, is refuted.
In the fighting for the liquidation of the German offensive, the troops of Lt.-Gen. Pukhov, Lt.-Gen. Galinin, Lt.-Gen. of Tank Forces Rodin, Lt.-Gen. Romanenko, Lt.-Gen. Kolpakchi, Lt.-Gen. Chistyakov, Lt.-Gen. of Tank Forces Katukov, Lt.-Gen. of Tank Forces Rotmistrov, Lt.-Gen. Zhadov, Lt.-Gen. Shumilov, Lt.-Gen. Kryuchenkin, and airmen of air formations under Col.-Gen. of Aviation Golovanov, Lt.-Gen. of Aviation Krasovsky, Lt.-Gen. of Aviation Rudenko and Lt.-Gen. of Aviation Naumenko, particularly distinguished themselves.
During the engagements from July 5-23, the enemy suffered the following losses: Officers and men killed, over 70,000; tanks destroyed or disabled, 2,900; self-propelling guns, 195; field guns, 844; planes destroyed, 1,392; and motor vehicles, over 5,000.
I congratulate you and the troops under your command on the successful liquidation of the German summer offensive. I express my gratitude to all men, commanders and political workers of the troops under your command for their excellent operations.
Immortal glory to the heroes who fell in the fight for the freedom and honour of our Motherland!
(Signed) J. V. Stalin
Supreme Commander-in-Chief
Marshal of the Soviet Union
Order includes reference to Lt. General Zhadov, Commander of the 5th Guards Army.
Order of the Day, July 24, 1943
Issued by Marshal Stalin and addressed to Army-General Rokossovsky, Army-General Valutin and Colonel-General Popov
Yesterday, on July 23, as the result of the successful operations of our troops, the complete liquidation of the German July offensive was accomplished in the areas south of Orel and north of Byelgorod in the direction of Kursk.
On the morning of July 5 the German-fascist troops, with large forces of tanks and infantry, supported by large air forces, passed to the offensive in the Orel-Kursk and Byelgorod-Kursk directions. The Germans hurled into attack against our troops their main forces, concentrated in the areas of Orel and Byelgorod.
As is now clear, the German Command sent into action: in the Orel-Kursk direction—seven tank, two motorized and eleven infantry divisions; and in the Byelgorod-Kursk direction—ten tank, one motorized and seven infantry divisions. Thus altogether the enemy hurled into attack seventeen tank, three motorized and eighteen German infantry divisions.
Concentrating these forces on narrow sectors of the front, the German Command reckoned, by concentric blows from the north and from the south in the general direction towards Kursk, on piercing our defences, and on encircling and wiping out our troops stationed along the arc of the Kursk salient.
This new German offensive did not take our troops unawares. They were prepared not only to repulse the German offensive, but also to deal mighty counter-blows. At the cost of tremendous losses in man-power and equipment, the enemy succeeded in driving a wedge into our defences to a depth of about nine kilometres (six miles) in the Orel-Kursk direction and of 15 to 35 kilometres in the Byelgorod-Kursk direction.
In fierce engagements our troops wore down and bled white the picked German divisions, and followed this up by violent counterblows by which they not only hurled back the enemy and completely restored the position they had occupied before July 5, but also broke through the enemy’s defences and advanced 15 to 25 kilometres towards Orel.
The battles fought for the liquidation of the German offensive have demonstrated the high military skill of our troops. Unprecedented examples of stubbornness, steadfastness and heroism have been displayed by the men and commanders of all arms, including artillery and mortar gunners, tankmen and airmen.
Thus, the German plan for a summer offensive can be considered as having failed completely. Thus the legend that in a summer offensive the Germans are always successful, and that the Soviet troops are compelled to retreat, is refuted.
In the fighting for the liquidation of the German offensive, the troops of Lt.-Gen. Pukhov, Lt.-Gen. Galinin, Lt.-Gen. of Tank Forces Rodin, Lt.-Gen. Romanenko, Lt.-Gen. Kolpakchi, Lt.-Gen. Chistyakov, Lt.-Gen. of Tank Forces Katukov, Lt.-Gen. of Tank Forces Rotmistrov, Lt.-Gen. Zhadov, Lt.-Gen. Shumilov, Lt.-Gen. Kryuchenkin, and airmen of air formations under Col.-Gen. of Aviation Golovanov, Lt.-Gen. of Aviation Krasovsky, Lt.-Gen. of Aviation Rudenko and Lt.-Gen. of Aviation Naumenko, particularly distinguished themselves.
During the engagements from July 5-23, the enemy suffered the following losses: Officers and men killed, over 70,000; tanks destroyed or disabled, 2,900; self-propelling guns, 195; field guns, 844; planes destroyed, 1,392; and motor vehicles, over 5,000.
I congratulate you and the troops under your command on the successful liquidation of the German summer offensive. I express my gratitude to all men, commanders and political workers of the troops under your command for their excellent operations.
Immortal glory to the heroes who fell in the fight for the freedom and honour of our Motherland!
(Signed) J. V. Stalin
Supreme Commander-in-Chief
Marshal of the Soviet Union
Order includes reference to Lt. General Zhadov, Commander of the 5th Guards Army.
Fourth Battle of Kharkov 5th-23rd August 1943.
Map of Soviet advance west of Kharkov between 11th-30th August 1943. The combat route of the 5th Guards Army is shown in the centre
For the assault on Kharkov, the Voronezh Front 6th and 5th Guards and 53rd Armies would attack on a front north and west of
the city. After reducing the Borisovka pocket, the Front would then drive on to Bogodukhov, about 35 km north west of Kharkov. The Steppe Front after taking Belgorod would attack south and assault the city itself from the east. The Southwestern Front would attack north from the south. The Fronts would envelope the city by sweeping over 60 km westwards and cutting off the German supply routes. The Germans forces west of Kharkov would engage in fierce battles to maintain supply routes and a corridor for their forces inside the city to escape, should it fall to the Soviets.
The 5th Guards Army was behind operational schedules because of the delays in the heavy fighting around Tomarovka. By the 5-6th August, the Division had taken part in operations to retake Graivoron, about 60 km south west of Belgorod.Thereafter the 5th Guards Army took part in the Belgorod-Bogodukhov axis of operations along the Merla River route.
Between the 6-11th August the Soviets had advanced 60-100km, the Voronezh Front's advance towards Kharkov having been spearheaded by the 1st Tank and 5th Guards Tank Army, which was finally checked by the German Army Detachment Kempf's newly arrived reinforcements of the 3rd SS Panzer "Das Reich", "Totenkopf" and "Viking" Divisions, north west of Kharkov.
By the 11th August the 5th Guards Army was deployed between the 6th Guards Army to its west and the 53rd Army to its east, northwest of Kharkov. The 5th Guards 32nd and 33rd Guards Rifle Corps and 42nd Guards Rifle Division were situated between at Lozovaya on its right flank and Chernoglasovka on its left flank, facing the German northern defenses, which had at this stage stopped the Soviet advance on Bogodukhov. The Division on 17th August took part in the actions west of Kharkov, the 32nd Guards Rifle Corps leading the attack to across the Bogodukhov-Kharkov railway line, which was the main supply route for the German defenders in the city from Poltava to the west.
On 18th August the Germans mounted counterattacks, and on 20 August "Totenkopf" and "Großdeutschland" Divisions, breached parts of the 5th and 6th Guards Armies and were able to get behind some Soviet units, including the 13th Guards. However, the trapped Soviet units heavily outnumbered the German units and many Soviet units were able to break out, some suffering heavy casualties. After this, the Soviet focus was to capture the city itself and after heavy fighting on 23 August it was liberated for the final time!
Units of the 32nd Guards Rifle Corps, including elements of 13th Guards took part in seizing Novye Merchik, which is situated south of the Kharkov-Poltava railway line between 28th-30th August.
Soviet troops on Dzerzhinsky Square after the liberation.
On August 13th August troops of the Steppe Front broke through the German outer city defenses and by the 17th fighting had begun in the northern outskirts of Kharkov and fierce street fighting began in the city.
Despite Hitler's insistence that Kharkov should be held, Field Marshal Manstein aware that the Germans could not defend the city for long with his diminishing resources against overwhelming Soviets forces, authorised the withdrawal from Kharkov on 21st August. During the night of the 22nd August the Germans commenced their withdrawal from the city, south along a desperately held corridor, in which the retreating German columns were bombarded by Soviet artillery and attacked by Soviet aircraft. During the early hours of 23rd August troops from The Steppe and Southwestern Fronts broke into the city centre itself after two hard days fighting and drove out the last of the German rearguard. By 1100 am that morning Kharkov had been retaken for the fourth and final time.On August 13 forces of Steppe Front broke through the external defensive line that the German command had prepared around the city and by the 17th fighting had begun in its northern outskirts. By 0200 am on 23 August 1943, elements of the 89th Rifle Division pushed into the city centre reaching Dzerzhinsky Square linking up with troops of the 183rd Rifle Division. The red banner was raised over the city once again and by 1100 am Kharkov and its outskirts had been taken completely for the final time!
During "Operation Rumyantsev" the Soviets opened up a 300 km breach in the German defenses and up to 145 km deep and routed fifteen German Divisions. As a result the German forces were forced to withdraw to new defenses on the River Dniepr, which opened up the route for the Soviets to retake Kiev. On 7th September 1943 the 5th Guards Army became part of the Steppe Front.
Despite Hitler's insistence that Kharkov should be held, Field Marshal Manstein aware that the Germans could not defend the city for long with his diminishing resources against overwhelming Soviets forces, authorised the withdrawal from Kharkov on 21st August. During the night of the 22nd August the Germans commenced their withdrawal from the city, south along a desperately held corridor, in which the retreating German columns were bombarded by Soviet artillery and attacked by Soviet aircraft. During the early hours of 23rd August troops from The Steppe and Southwestern Fronts broke into the city centre itself after two hard days fighting and drove out the last of the German rearguard. By 1100 am that morning Kharkov had been retaken for the fourth and final time.On August 13 forces of Steppe Front broke through the external defensive line that the German command had prepared around the city and by the 17th fighting had begun in its northern outskirts. By 0200 am on 23 August 1943, elements of the 89th Rifle Division pushed into the city centre reaching Dzerzhinsky Square linking up with troops of the 183rd Rifle Division. The red banner was raised over the city once again and by 1100 am Kharkov and its outskirts had been taken completely for the final time!
During "Operation Rumyantsev" the Soviets opened up a 300 km breach in the German defenses and up to 145 km deep and routed fifteen German Divisions. As a result the German forces were forced to withdraw to new defenses on the River Dniepr, which opened up the route for the Soviets to retake Kiev. On 7th September 1943 the 5th Guards Army became part of the Steppe Front.
Honorific title "Poltavaskaya".
Original image of Soviet troops liberating Poltava.
Chernikov - Poltava Operations 26/8/43 - 30/9/43.
Following the liberation of Kharkov, the Division as part of the 5th Guards Army, Steppe Front took part in the operations to capture the regional town of Poltava, which was a strong German defensive centre. Poltava is situated about 120km southwest of Kharkov. The 5th Guards Army reached the eastern edges of the town on 21st September 1943 and after two days of fierce fighting, liberated Poltava on 23rd September. In recognition of courage and bravery and the exemplary fulfilment of the combat assignments and successful military operations and for the liberation of the city Poltava, by the order of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief from September 23, 1943 No. 22, the liberating units, including the 13th Guards were awarded the honorary title "Poltava".
Following the liberation of Kharkov, the Division as part of the 5th Guards Army, Steppe Front took part in the operations to capture the regional town of Poltava, which was a strong German defensive centre. Poltava is situated about 120km southwest of Kharkov. The 5th Guards Army reached the eastern edges of the town on 21st September 1943 and after two days of fierce fighting, liberated Poltava on 23rd September. In recognition of courage and bravery and the exemplary fulfilment of the combat assignments and successful military operations and for the liberation of the city Poltava, by the order of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief from September 23, 1943 No. 22, the liberating units, including the 13th Guards were awarded the honorary title "Poltava".
The Lower Dniepr Operations.
26/9/43 - 20/12/43.
Hitler aware that the German Forces were no longer capable of mounting large scale decisive operations following Kursk, on 11th August 1943 he authorised the building of the Panther-Wotan Line, also known as the "East Wall". The northern defences ran from the Baltic Sea at Narva and followed the western banks of Lake Peipus and on to Vitebsk. In the south the defences followed the River Dniepr, west of Smolensk to the Black Sea. The Dniepr was a formidable natural line of defence, the river in some places was up to three kilometres wide and the west bank was considerably higher and steeper than the east bank. The Germans could not possibly hope to defend the entire line and concentrated the strongest defenses at the likely places of Soviet attacks such as at Kremenchug, Nikopol and Zaporozhye.
On 15th September 1943 Hitler ordered the German Forces to withdraw to the "East Wall" . Strong garrison forces and rear guards were left in towns to slow down the Soviets. The battle to retake Poltava was a hard fought and costly example and also a "scorched earth" policy to deny the Soviets of local resources was also implimented. However, because of the time scales the defenses in places were only partially completed, particular in the north and at the south near the Black Sea were the weakest.
Stalin planned for an immediate and broad front operation, rather than a delayed build up of Soviet forces in a concentrated area of operations on weakened German defenses. He wanted to deny the Germans the time to develope their defenses and also for political reasons wanted to retake Kiev before the 7th November, an important anniversary date in the Soviet calendar. The Soviet advance to the Dniepr was costly and casualties were high as the Germans defended every city and town ferociously. However the Soviets were on the river in the north near the Pripyat river and by the end of September the lower part of the Dniepr was reached.
On the 21st September, troops of the 3rd Tank Army of the Vorenezh Front commenced to force crossings of the Dniepr using make shift rafts and even swimming, to establish some small bridgeheads. The same day, STAVKA ordered airborne troops of the Vorennezh Front to be dropped in the area of Kaniv and Rzhishchev in order to consolidate the fragile bridgeheads. The airborne operations commenced late on the 24th and were hastily planned, supplied and executed. The airborne troops fought bravely and tenaciously. However, the operations were a disaster, resulting in 61% casualties and the surviving forces reduced to linking up with local partisan forces and continuing to fight for several weeks afterwards.
Hitler aware that the German Forces were no longer capable of mounting large scale decisive operations following Kursk, on 11th August 1943 he authorised the building of the Panther-Wotan Line, also known as the "East Wall". The northern defences ran from the Baltic Sea at Narva and followed the western banks of Lake Peipus and on to Vitebsk. In the south the defences followed the River Dniepr, west of Smolensk to the Black Sea. The Dniepr was a formidable natural line of defence, the river in some places was up to three kilometres wide and the west bank was considerably higher and steeper than the east bank. The Germans could not possibly hope to defend the entire line and concentrated the strongest defenses at the likely places of Soviet attacks such as at Kremenchug, Nikopol and Zaporozhye.
On 15th September 1943 Hitler ordered the German Forces to withdraw to the "East Wall" . Strong garrison forces and rear guards were left in towns to slow down the Soviets. The battle to retake Poltava was a hard fought and costly example and also a "scorched earth" policy to deny the Soviets of local resources was also implimented. However, because of the time scales the defenses in places were only partially completed, particular in the north and at the south near the Black Sea were the weakest.
Stalin planned for an immediate and broad front operation, rather than a delayed build up of Soviet forces in a concentrated area of operations on weakened German defenses. He wanted to deny the Germans the time to develope their defenses and also for political reasons wanted to retake Kiev before the 7th November, an important anniversary date in the Soviet calendar. The Soviet advance to the Dniepr was costly and casualties were high as the Germans defended every city and town ferociously. However the Soviets were on the river in the north near the Pripyat river and by the end of September the lower part of the Dniepr was reached.
On the 21st September, troops of the 3rd Tank Army of the Vorenezh Front commenced to force crossings of the Dniepr using make shift rafts and even swimming, to establish some small bridgeheads. The same day, STAVKA ordered airborne troops of the Vorennezh Front to be dropped in the area of Kaniv and Rzhishchev in order to consolidate the fragile bridgeheads. The airborne operations commenced late on the 24th and were hastily planned, supplied and executed. The airborne troops fought bravely and tenaciously. However, the operations were a disaster, resulting in 61% casualties and the surviving forces reduced to linking up with local partisan forces and continuing to fight for several weeks afterwards.
Soviet troops forcing the River Dniepr.
The initial assaults occurred on a 300km front and further bridgeheads were established at Dniprodzerzhinsk on the 24th, Dnipropetrovsk on the 25th and at Kremenchug on the 28th September. Despite extreme difficulty, by the end of September 23 bridgeheads had been created on the western bank of the Dniepr by the Soviets.
The 13th Guards took part in the crossing operations at Kremenchug as part of the 2nd Ukrainian Front Lower Dniepr operations On the night of 5th October at Vlasovka, upstream of Kremenchug, the Division as part of the 32nd Guards Rifle Corps, commenced operations to land on the island of Peschanny. The eastern channel of the Dniepr was about 700 metres wide and the western channel was a further 400 metres wide, but shallower. Soviet soldiers had to make the crossing by small vessels,makeshift rafts and by individual flotation, under German bombardment.
Peschanny was a large flat sandy and featureless island of about 5 square kilometres. German infantry occupied the western banks of the island, whilst German artillery on the western bank of the Dneipr bombarded the Soviets in the centre of the island and the far eastern bank of the river.
Although the order to withdraw from the island was given, the Division fought on the island for a further two days recrossing to the north bank on 10th October, having received high casualties from German bombing and artillery fire. The action was in fact a "false crossing" operation, intended to draw German forces from elsewhere to concentrate in the Kremenchug area. As a result Soviet troops were able to force crossings and establish bridgeheads both upstream and downstream of Kremenchug.
The Germans commenced immediate counter attacks bombing Soviet bridgeheads and reinforcing troops waiting to cross the river. Most Soviet Divisions were under 50% operational strength by early October and in the 32nd Guards Rifle Corps, entire regiments were down to battalion or less strengths.
By mid October, Soviet forces were sufficiently established to mount major assaults to further secure the southern Dniepr, the 13th Guards taking part in the Kremenchug - Dnipropetrovsk line operations. Simultaneous large scale Soviet diversionary operations were also conducted to draw German forces away from the southern Dniepr and Kiev areas. On the 20th October the Voronezh Front was renamed the 1st Ukrainian Front to reflect the Soviets advance from Russia westwards. ( Kalinin Front became 1st Baltic, Baltic Front the 2nd Baltic, Central Front the Belorussian, Voronezh Front became 1st Ukrainian Front, Steppe Front became 2nd Ukrainian, Southwestern Front the 3rd Ukrainian and the Southern Front became the 4th Ukrainian Fronts respectively.In February 1944 the Belorussian became the 1st Belorussian when the 2nd Belorussian Front was formed from various other armies.The 3rd Belorussian Front was created in April 1944.)
The Division also took part in the operations south west of Kremenchug cutting the vital German supply railway link Smela to Znamenka on 6th December and the capture of Znamenka on the 9th December. Znamenka was a key communications and railway centre supplying Kiev and had been fortified by a strong German force, which fell to the Soviets after three days hard fighting. Kiev in separate operations was liberated early on the 6th November as Stalin had ordered and by the end of the Dniepr operations the Soviets had consolidated a 300 km wide bridgehead and in places up to 80 km deep. In the Crimea the German 17th Army was also now cut off from the rest of their forces.
The Dniepr Offensive was one of the largest and costliest operations of the war with casualties on both sides estimated between 1.7 to 2.5 million according to differing sources.
The 13th Guards took part in the crossing operations at Kremenchug as part of the 2nd Ukrainian Front Lower Dniepr operations On the night of 5th October at Vlasovka, upstream of Kremenchug, the Division as part of the 32nd Guards Rifle Corps, commenced operations to land on the island of Peschanny. The eastern channel of the Dniepr was about 700 metres wide and the western channel was a further 400 metres wide, but shallower. Soviet soldiers had to make the crossing by small vessels,makeshift rafts and by individual flotation, under German bombardment.
Peschanny was a large flat sandy and featureless island of about 5 square kilometres. German infantry occupied the western banks of the island, whilst German artillery on the western bank of the Dneipr bombarded the Soviets in the centre of the island and the far eastern bank of the river.
Although the order to withdraw from the island was given, the Division fought on the island for a further two days recrossing to the north bank on 10th October, having received high casualties from German bombing and artillery fire. The action was in fact a "false crossing" operation, intended to draw German forces from elsewhere to concentrate in the Kremenchug area. As a result Soviet troops were able to force crossings and establish bridgeheads both upstream and downstream of Kremenchug.
The Germans commenced immediate counter attacks bombing Soviet bridgeheads and reinforcing troops waiting to cross the river. Most Soviet Divisions were under 50% operational strength by early October and in the 32nd Guards Rifle Corps, entire regiments were down to battalion or less strengths.
By mid October, Soviet forces were sufficiently established to mount major assaults to further secure the southern Dniepr, the 13th Guards taking part in the Kremenchug - Dnipropetrovsk line operations. Simultaneous large scale Soviet diversionary operations were also conducted to draw German forces away from the southern Dniepr and Kiev areas. On the 20th October the Voronezh Front was renamed the 1st Ukrainian Front to reflect the Soviets advance from Russia westwards. ( Kalinin Front became 1st Baltic, Baltic Front the 2nd Baltic, Central Front the Belorussian, Voronezh Front became 1st Ukrainian Front, Steppe Front became 2nd Ukrainian, Southwestern Front the 3rd Ukrainian and the Southern Front became the 4th Ukrainian Fronts respectively.In February 1944 the Belorussian became the 1st Belorussian when the 2nd Belorussian Front was formed from various other armies.The 3rd Belorussian Front was created in April 1944.)
The Division also took part in the operations south west of Kremenchug cutting the vital German supply railway link Smela to Znamenka on 6th December and the capture of Znamenka on the 9th December. Znamenka was a key communications and railway centre supplying Kiev and had been fortified by a strong German force, which fell to the Soviets after three days hard fighting. Kiev in separate operations was liberated early on the 6th November as Stalin had ordered and by the end of the Dniepr operations the Soviets had consolidated a 300 km wide bridgehead and in places up to 80 km deep. In the Crimea the German 17th Army was also now cut off from the rest of their forces.
The Dniepr Offensive was one of the largest and costliest operations of the war with casualties on both sides estimated between 1.7 to 2.5 million according to differing sources.
Schematic map showing the Soviet assault to capture Kremenchug on the Dniepr. On the left, the 13th Guards Rifle and 6th Guards Airborne Divisions, 32nd Guards Rifle Corps route is shown crossing to the island of Peschanny. On the right the 33rd Guards Rifle Corps 95th Guards Rifle and 9th Guards Airborne Divisions assault Kovalevka and Kremenchug respectively, supported by units of the 53rd Army to the east.
1944.
Schematic map showing the march route of individual 5th Guards Army units between to 8th-12th October 1943, to their new forming up positions east of Kremenchug, prior to the Army planned crossing operations of the Dnepr. The 13th Guards are shown on the extreme left, having crossed from the island of Peschanny on the 10th and and made the 65 km march to the new forming up positions by the 12th October.
Kirovograd 5-16/1/1944.
Following the capture of Znamyenka the 5th and 7th Guards Armies were deployed to capture Kirovograd some 45 km to the southwest. The Division's start point was 15 km southwest of Znamyenka, during the advance Soviet forces engaged in several fierce German rearguard actions on route to Kirovograd. Crossing the River Adzhamka, the Division took part in the capture of Subottsi, advanced southwest between Marevka and Zeleniy Hai, towards the northern suburbs of Kirovograd, the site of the modern day city airport, before pursuing enemy forces east towards Oboznovka. The Division then swung southwest,and was between Blagodatnoe and Karlovka by the 8th-9th January,some 25 km west of Kirovograd, by which time the city had been totally surrounded and was cut off from German forces to the west. This was the first of many successful engagements by the Division during the coming months of early 1944!
Following the capture of Znamyenka the 5th and 7th Guards Armies were deployed to capture Kirovograd some 45 km to the southwest. The Division's start point was 15 km southwest of Znamyenka, during the advance Soviet forces engaged in several fierce German rearguard actions on route to Kirovograd. Crossing the River Adzhamka, the Division took part in the capture of Subottsi, advanced southwest between Marevka and Zeleniy Hai, towards the northern suburbs of Kirovograd, the site of the modern day city airport, before pursuing enemy forces east towards Oboznovka. The Division then swung southwest,and was between Blagodatnoe and Karlovka by the 8th-9th January,some 25 km west of Kirovograd, by which time the city had been totally surrounded and was cut off from German forces to the west. This was the first of many successful engagements by the Division during the coming months of early 1944!
Dniepr-Carpathian Strategic Offensive. The liberation of right bank Ukraine.
Dnieper–Carpathian Offensive 24/12/43 - 14/4/44, was a strategic offensive conducted from north to south by the 1st Belorussian Front and the 1st, 2nd, 3rd and 4th Ukrainian Fronts directed against the German Army Group South. Its intention was to retake all of the Axis occupied Ukrainian and Moldavian territories. The resultant operation completely destroyed eighteen German and Romanian divisions and a further sixty eight divisions were each reduced to under half their respective establishment strength and took the Red Army forces into eastern Poland and northern Romania.
The Lower Dniepr Offensive Operation in the autumn of 1943 had secured the left-bank (eastern) Ukraine and cut off the German 17th Army in the Crimea, The Soviet forces had established several bridgeheads on the western bank of the Dniepr river, which were expanded throughout November and December 1943 to become the platforms from which to launch the Dniepr-Carpathian Strategic Offensive Operation. Several large German salients were left along the Dniepr, including one to the south of Kiev centred on the city of Korsun, between the areas of the 1st and 2nd Ukrainian Fronts, and another to the south, around Krivoi Rog and Nikopol.
The Dniepr-Carpathian Offensive Operation contained several operational elements conducted in two phases. Phase 1, between 24/12/43 - 29/2/44, included the Zhitomir-Berdichev Offensive Operation (24/12/43 - 14/1/44), Kirovograd Offensive Operation (5-16/1/44), Korsun-Shevchenkovsky Offensive Operation (24/1/44 - 17/2/44), Rovno-Lutsk Offensive Operation (27/1/44 - 11/2/44) and Nikopol-Krivoi Rog Offensive Operation (30/1/44 - 29/2/44). Phase 2, between 4/3/44 - 14/4/44, included the Proskurov-Chernovtsy Offensive Operation (4/3/4 - 17/4/44), Uman-Botosani Offensive Operation (5/3/44 - 17/4/44), Bereznegovatoye-Snigirevka Offensive Operation (6 -18/3/44), Polesskoye Offensive Operation (15/3/44 - 5/4/44) and Odessa Offensive Operation (26/3/44 - 14/4/44).
The 13th Guards Rifle Division, 32nd Guards Rifle Corps of the 5th Guards Army took part in the Kirovograd, Korsun-Shevchenkovsky and Uman-Botosani Offensive Operations. On 17th January 1944 Rodimtsev was promoted to General Lieutenant.
The 2nd Ukrainian Front commenced the Kirovograd Offensive on 5th January and was directed mainly against XXXXVIIth Panzer Corps of the 8th Army. Not all forces in 2nd Ukrainian Front were used, the main attacking armies were from north to south the 53rd Army, 5th and 7th Guards Army with 5th Guards Tank Army as a mobile force. In the north the 4th Guards Army supported the attacking forces and in the south the 57th Army protected their flank.
The Kirovograd attack was conducted on a sector that was 80 km wide with 30 Rifle Divisions (4th Guards Army, 5th Guards Army, 7th Guards Army and 53rd Army). In the areas where the planned breaches were to be made the concentrations were even higher and the main attacking Rifle Divisions had sectors that were only 1, 5 km wide.
The 5th Guards Army and the 5th Mechanised Corps were to outflank Kirovograd from the north west and the 7th Guards Army and 5th Guards Tank Army were to move to the south west. The offensive was conducted in conditions of heavy snow and rainfall with freezing temparatures as low as minus 27 degrees. Despite these conditions the attack started well and by the evening of 7th January the Soviet forces had broken into the southern suburbs of Kirovograd and in the north west the Kirovograd - Novo Ukrainka road and railway was cut, whilst the 18th Tank Corps swept to the south of the town. Kirovograd was cleared of German forces by the 8th January and Soviet forces had advanced ten miles west of the town.
Korsun- Shevchenkovsky Operations 24/1- 18/2/44.(Often referred in the west as the Korsun-Cherkassy Operation)
During January and February 1944 the Division took part in the Korsun Cherkassy Salient Operations. The salient was 125 km wide and 90km deep and protruded the forward inner flanks of the 1st Ukrainian Front to the north and the 2nd Ukrainian Front to the south. Inside were two German corps from Army Group South, 42 Corps (1st Panzer Army) and 11 Corps (8th Army) totalling six divisions in strength. The Soviets viewed it as an opportunity to conduct a double envelopment to trap German forces in the salient on a scale to that at Stalingrad.The Soviet plan's involved to an unusual degree on operational deception, diversionary attacks, deep penetration by tank armies,overwhelming forces at selected narrow breakthrough points and synronised operations between fronts capitalising on the strengths of all combat branches. The elements of the operation would become the Soviet operational design for almost every subsequent operation thereafter and increase the operational capabilities of the Red Army for the remainder of the war.
The operation began on the 26th January (delayed from 25th) by forces of the 2nd Ukrainian Front, the 4th Guards and 53rd Armies, 5th Guards Tank Army and supported by the 5th Air Army. The following day the 1st Ukrainian Front began its attack with 27th and 40th Armies, 6th Tank Army and supported by the 2nd Air Army. The time scale was two days for the fronts to link up the encirclement and a further three days to destroy the entrapped German forces within. The operation did not initially proceed as planned, the link up between the fronts did not take place until the 28th January and it took a further three days for the encirclement to be completed, in what is now referred to as the 'Korsun Pocket'. Attempts to relieve the pocket and subsequent break outs meant the battles for the salient were to continue for over two weeks beyond the planned dates.
The Germans defended remarkably well given they were overstretched and the weather played its part also. On the 2nd February the winter thaw started two months earlier than usual, turning the roads and terrain into a quagmire of mud, hampering movement by both German and Soviet forces. At its conclusion, the Soviets claimed victory by eliminating the salient and bringing the 1st and 2nd Ukrainian Fronts together. However, the planned elimination of the German forces did not come to full fruition, as about 40,000 of the 58,000 trapped German forces managed to escape annihilation. The Germans abandoned masses of materiel, vehicles and equipment which resulted in the Army Group Centre armoured forces being almost permanently crippled for the remainder of the war. Although different source conflict, it is estimated both side each lost between 50,000 and 75,000 troops during the offensive.
The 13th Guards Rifle Division.
During the operation the frontline forces of the 5th and 7th Guards Armies engaged in offensive preparations and conducted intensive reconnaissance operations. As part of the final preparations, on the 23rd January the 13th and 97th Guards Divisions began diversionary assaults. The purpose of such diversionary attacks was to probe and to identify the areas of the German defences which would be assaulted in the impending main operation. As a result the operation start date was delayed from 24th to 25th January. Also, at the same time the 5th Guards Tank Army was concluding its 100km night time marches (between 19-23 January) to its real concentration area near Krasnosilka as part of the deception (maskiroviy) plans.
The Lower Dniepr Offensive Operation in the autumn of 1943 had secured the left-bank (eastern) Ukraine and cut off the German 17th Army in the Crimea, The Soviet forces had established several bridgeheads on the western bank of the Dniepr river, which were expanded throughout November and December 1943 to become the platforms from which to launch the Dniepr-Carpathian Strategic Offensive Operation. Several large German salients were left along the Dniepr, including one to the south of Kiev centred on the city of Korsun, between the areas of the 1st and 2nd Ukrainian Fronts, and another to the south, around Krivoi Rog and Nikopol.
The Dniepr-Carpathian Offensive Operation contained several operational elements conducted in two phases. Phase 1, between 24/12/43 - 29/2/44, included the Zhitomir-Berdichev Offensive Operation (24/12/43 - 14/1/44), Kirovograd Offensive Operation (5-16/1/44), Korsun-Shevchenkovsky Offensive Operation (24/1/44 - 17/2/44), Rovno-Lutsk Offensive Operation (27/1/44 - 11/2/44) and Nikopol-Krivoi Rog Offensive Operation (30/1/44 - 29/2/44). Phase 2, between 4/3/44 - 14/4/44, included the Proskurov-Chernovtsy Offensive Operation (4/3/4 - 17/4/44), Uman-Botosani Offensive Operation (5/3/44 - 17/4/44), Bereznegovatoye-Snigirevka Offensive Operation (6 -18/3/44), Polesskoye Offensive Operation (15/3/44 - 5/4/44) and Odessa Offensive Operation (26/3/44 - 14/4/44).
The 13th Guards Rifle Division, 32nd Guards Rifle Corps of the 5th Guards Army took part in the Kirovograd, Korsun-Shevchenkovsky and Uman-Botosani Offensive Operations. On 17th January 1944 Rodimtsev was promoted to General Lieutenant.
The 2nd Ukrainian Front commenced the Kirovograd Offensive on 5th January and was directed mainly against XXXXVIIth Panzer Corps of the 8th Army. Not all forces in 2nd Ukrainian Front were used, the main attacking armies were from north to south the 53rd Army, 5th and 7th Guards Army with 5th Guards Tank Army as a mobile force. In the north the 4th Guards Army supported the attacking forces and in the south the 57th Army protected their flank.
The Kirovograd attack was conducted on a sector that was 80 km wide with 30 Rifle Divisions (4th Guards Army, 5th Guards Army, 7th Guards Army and 53rd Army). In the areas where the planned breaches were to be made the concentrations were even higher and the main attacking Rifle Divisions had sectors that were only 1, 5 km wide.
The 5th Guards Army and the 5th Mechanised Corps were to outflank Kirovograd from the north west and the 7th Guards Army and 5th Guards Tank Army were to move to the south west. The offensive was conducted in conditions of heavy snow and rainfall with freezing temparatures as low as minus 27 degrees. Despite these conditions the attack started well and by the evening of 7th January the Soviet forces had broken into the southern suburbs of Kirovograd and in the north west the Kirovograd - Novo Ukrainka road and railway was cut, whilst the 18th Tank Corps swept to the south of the town. Kirovograd was cleared of German forces by the 8th January and Soviet forces had advanced ten miles west of the town.
Korsun- Shevchenkovsky Operations 24/1- 18/2/44.(Often referred in the west as the Korsun-Cherkassy Operation)
During January and February 1944 the Division took part in the Korsun Cherkassy Salient Operations. The salient was 125 km wide and 90km deep and protruded the forward inner flanks of the 1st Ukrainian Front to the north and the 2nd Ukrainian Front to the south. Inside were two German corps from Army Group South, 42 Corps (1st Panzer Army) and 11 Corps (8th Army) totalling six divisions in strength. The Soviets viewed it as an opportunity to conduct a double envelopment to trap German forces in the salient on a scale to that at Stalingrad.The Soviet plan's involved to an unusual degree on operational deception, diversionary attacks, deep penetration by tank armies,overwhelming forces at selected narrow breakthrough points and synronised operations between fronts capitalising on the strengths of all combat branches. The elements of the operation would become the Soviet operational design for almost every subsequent operation thereafter and increase the operational capabilities of the Red Army for the remainder of the war.
The operation began on the 26th January (delayed from 25th) by forces of the 2nd Ukrainian Front, the 4th Guards and 53rd Armies, 5th Guards Tank Army and supported by the 5th Air Army. The following day the 1st Ukrainian Front began its attack with 27th and 40th Armies, 6th Tank Army and supported by the 2nd Air Army. The time scale was two days for the fronts to link up the encirclement and a further three days to destroy the entrapped German forces within. The operation did not initially proceed as planned, the link up between the fronts did not take place until the 28th January and it took a further three days for the encirclement to be completed, in what is now referred to as the 'Korsun Pocket'. Attempts to relieve the pocket and subsequent break outs meant the battles for the salient were to continue for over two weeks beyond the planned dates.
The Germans defended remarkably well given they were overstretched and the weather played its part also. On the 2nd February the winter thaw started two months earlier than usual, turning the roads and terrain into a quagmire of mud, hampering movement by both German and Soviet forces. At its conclusion, the Soviets claimed victory by eliminating the salient and bringing the 1st and 2nd Ukrainian Fronts together. However, the planned elimination of the German forces did not come to full fruition, as about 40,000 of the 58,000 trapped German forces managed to escape annihilation. The Germans abandoned masses of materiel, vehicles and equipment which resulted in the Army Group Centre armoured forces being almost permanently crippled for the remainder of the war. Although different source conflict, it is estimated both side each lost between 50,000 and 75,000 troops during the offensive.
The 13th Guards Rifle Division.
During the operation the frontline forces of the 5th and 7th Guards Armies engaged in offensive preparations and conducted intensive reconnaissance operations. As part of the final preparations, on the 23rd January the 13th and 97th Guards Divisions began diversionary assaults. The purpose of such diversionary attacks was to probe and to identify the areas of the German defences which would be assaulted in the impending main operation. As a result the operation start date was delayed from 24th to 25th January. Also, at the same time the 5th Guards Tank Army was concluding its 100km night time marches (between 19-23 January) to its real concentration area near Krasnosilka as part of the deception (maskiroviy) plans.
Uman-Botoshany Offensive 5th March - 17th April 1944.
The operation was conducted by the forces of the 2nd Ukrainian Front and the purpose was to defeat the German "Uman group", and split the Army Group South and capture south-western Ukraine from von Manstein's 8th Army.
The operation began on 5 March on a 175 km sector of the front, the main attacking forces were the 27th, 52nd, 4th Guards, the 2nd and 5th Guards and 6th Tank armies and supported by the 5th Air Army. The 7th and 5th Guards armies conducted supporting attacks from the Kirovograd direction. The main thrust was by the 2nd and 5th Guards Tank Armies and by the 10th March Uman was taken and the retreating German forces were being pursued towards the River South Bug. Advance units soon reached the South Bug and without pausing a river crossing was accomplished on a 100km front. The 6th Tank Army was introduced after the crossing to maintain the rate of the Soviet advance towards the Dniester River and by 17th March advance units of 2nd Ukrainian Front had entered Moldavian territory.
As a result the 1st and 2nd Ukrainian Fronts had split the German Army Group South in two, the 8th Army was cut off from the 1st Panzer Army and was assigned to Army Group A, who became the main focus of destruction by the 2nd Ukrainian Front. The 2nd Ukrainian Front attacked in a southern direction to cut off withdrawal routes of Army Group A beyond the River Dniester and destroy it in cooperation with the 3rd Ukrainian Front. On the northern flank of the 2nd Ukrainian Front, the 40th Army, tasked to cut off the 1st Panzer Army, advanced along the east bank of the Dniester in collaboration with troops of the 1st Ukrainian Front resulting in the elimination of German troops encircled at Kamianets-Podilskyi and deflecting a German counter attack at Khotyn. By the 28th March the front had crossed the River Prut and were fighting in Romanian territory and Botoshany was taken by the Soviets by 7th April. By the middle of April the 2nd Ukrainian Front in the north had reached the Carpathian Mountains. In the centre the front was approaching Jassy and in the south Kishinev (Chisinau, capital of modern day Moldavia)
The German command moved 18 divisions and 3 brigades of its last reserves into the southern sector in order to save it from total destruction. As a result, the 2nd Ukrainian Front encountering increasing resistance, in the middle of April was forced to go on the defensive at the reached positions of Dubossary, north of Jassy, and some 60 km south of Botoshany.
The 5th Guards Army.
The 5th and 7th Guards Armies delivered supporting attacks, south west from the Kirovograd region in the direction of Novoukrainka. By the 22nd March the 5th Guards had advanced 130 km to take Novoukrainka and Pervomaisk. By the 17th April the 5th Guards had fought a further 180 km, crossed the Moldavian border to reach the River Dniester at Tashlyk, just south of Dubossary, which is some 40 km north east of Kishinev (Chisinau), the capital of Moldova. Here because of increased German resistance the 5th Guards undertook defensive operations, during which high casualties were sustained by both sides in that area. A small bridgehead (Serpeni Bridgehead)was established on the west (right) bank of the Dniester south of Dubossary in the area of the of the villages of Speia and Serpeni in the enclave.
Order of the Red Banner.
For courage and bravery and the exemplary fulfilment of the combat assignments and successful military operations and for the liberation of the city of Novoukrainka, by the decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR of March 29, 1944, the Division was awarded it's second Order of the Red Banner.
For courage and bravery and the exemplary fulfilment of the combat assignments and successful military operations and for the liberation of the city of Novoukrainka, by the decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR of March 29, 1944, the Division was awarded it's second Order of the Red Banner.
Order of Suvorov of the 2nd Degree.
For courage and bravery and the exemplary fulfilment of the combat assignments and successful military operations and for the liberation of the city of Pervomaisk and the crossing of the River Southern Bug, by the decree of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet on April 1, 1944, the Division was awarded the Order of Suvorov of the II degree.
The order was instituted on 29th July 1942 and was awarded in three different degrees.
The 1st Degree is awarded to army commanders for exceptional direction of combat operations
The 2nd Degree is awarded to corps, divisions and brigade commanders for a decisive victory over a numerically superior enemy.
The 3rd Degree order is awarded to regimental commanders, their chiefs of staff, and battalion and company commanders for outstanding leadership leading to a battle victory.
For courage and bravery and the exemplary fulfilment of the combat assignments and successful military operations and for the liberation of the city of Pervomaisk and the crossing of the River Southern Bug, by the decree of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet on April 1, 1944, the Division was awarded the Order of Suvorov of the II degree.
The order was instituted on 29th July 1942 and was awarded in three different degrees.
The 1st Degree is awarded to army commanders for exceptional direction of combat operations
The 2nd Degree is awarded to corps, divisions and brigade commanders for a decisive victory over a numerically superior enemy.
The 3rd Degree order is awarded to regimental commanders, their chiefs of staff, and battalion and company commanders for outstanding leadership leading to a battle victory.
The Jassy–Kishinev Operation.
The Jassy–Kishinev Operation, named after the two major cities Jassy and Kishinev, was the Soviet offensive by the 2nd and 3rd Ukrainian Fronts which took place in eastern Romania engaging Army Group South Ukraine. The Red Army had made an unsuccessful attack in the sector between 8th April - 6th June 1944, which is sometimes referred to as the 1st Jassy- Kishinev Offensive . The Germans had been pushed back along the entire eastern front and by May 1944 Army Group South Ukraine had retreated towards the pre war Romanian frontier. After June, relative calm returned to the sector which allowed the Germans to strengthen their formations.
5th Guards Army transferred to the 1st Ukrainian Front.
On 26 June 1944 the 5th Guards Army was transferred to the STAVKA reserve. On 13 July it was transferred to the 1st Ukrainian Front and by mid-July its troops were concentrated around Skalat, south of Ternopol in western Ukraine. During July and August, the Division fought in the Lvov-Sandomierz Offensive. For the next six months after the offensive the army fought in heavy battles to retain the Sandomierz bridgehead.
Between 20th-29th August 1944 the 2nd and 3rd Ukrainian Fronts conducted further operations in the Jassy- Kishinev sector against combined German and Romanian formations which resulted in the encirclement and destruction of the Axis forces in Moldavia and opened the route into Romania, the Balkans and the strategic advance of Soviet forces further into eastern Europe.
In a coup initiated by King Michael of Romania, on 23rd August 1944 allegiance was switched from the Axis powers to the Allies. Romania's armistice was signed three weeks later on 12th September under terms dictated by the Soviet Union.
The Jassy–Kishinev Operation, named after the two major cities Jassy and Kishinev, was the Soviet offensive by the 2nd and 3rd Ukrainian Fronts which took place in eastern Romania engaging Army Group South Ukraine. The Red Army had made an unsuccessful attack in the sector between 8th April - 6th June 1944, which is sometimes referred to as the 1st Jassy- Kishinev Offensive . The Germans had been pushed back along the entire eastern front and by May 1944 Army Group South Ukraine had retreated towards the pre war Romanian frontier. After June, relative calm returned to the sector which allowed the Germans to strengthen their formations.
5th Guards Army transferred to the 1st Ukrainian Front.
On 26 June 1944 the 5th Guards Army was transferred to the STAVKA reserve. On 13 July it was transferred to the 1st Ukrainian Front and by mid-July its troops were concentrated around Skalat, south of Ternopol in western Ukraine. During July and August, the Division fought in the Lvov-Sandomierz Offensive. For the next six months after the offensive the army fought in heavy battles to retain the Sandomierz bridgehead.
Between 20th-29th August 1944 the 2nd and 3rd Ukrainian Fronts conducted further operations in the Jassy- Kishinev sector against combined German and Romanian formations which resulted in the encirclement and destruction of the Axis forces in Moldavia and opened the route into Romania, the Balkans and the strategic advance of Soviet forces further into eastern Europe.
In a coup initiated by King Michael of Romania, on 23rd August 1944 allegiance was switched from the Axis powers to the Allies. Romania's armistice was signed three weeks later on 12th September under terms dictated by the Soviet Union.
The Serpeni Bridgehead Memorial.
The construction work for the memorial was initiated during the Soviet Union era and consisted of only a few basic elements. The memorial was constructed on the exact land on which the battles took place, an area which did not exceed more than an eight kilometre frontage. The current memorial was consecrated on 22nd August 2014. More than eleven thousand Soviet soldiers who perished in the battles in the vicinity are commemorated here. An ‘eternal flame’ burns indefinitely for the fallen.
The top two images show the 5th Guards Army memorial at Serpeni where the 32nd and 33 Guards Rifle Corps are commemorated. The respective Corps consisted of the following units: 32nd Guards Rifle Corps the 13th Guards, 6th Guards Airborne and 66th Guards Rifle Divisions. 33rd Guards Rifle Corps the 9th Guards Airborne, 95th Guards and 97th Guards Rifle Divisions.
The construction work for the memorial was initiated during the Soviet Union era and consisted of only a few basic elements. The memorial was constructed on the exact land on which the battles took place, an area which did not exceed more than an eight kilometre frontage. The current memorial was consecrated on 22nd August 2014. More than eleven thousand Soviet soldiers who perished in the battles in the vicinity are commemorated here. An ‘eternal flame’ burns indefinitely for the fallen.
The top two images show the 5th Guards Army memorial at Serpeni where the 32nd and 33 Guards Rifle Corps are commemorated. The respective Corps consisted of the following units: 32nd Guards Rifle Corps the 13th Guards, 6th Guards Airborne and 66th Guards Rifle Divisions. 33rd Guards Rifle Corps the 9th Guards Airborne, 95th Guards and 97th Guards Rifle Divisions.
History.
THE HISTORY OF THE 13TH GUARDS.
The history of the Division is an on going project and involves continuing research or updating as necessary. Currently, the period from mid 1944 to the end of the war is awaiting compilation, which will cover the remaining campaigns the Division participated in, namely the Lvov–Sandomierz Offensive, Vistula–Oder Offensive, Berlin Strategic Offensive & , Prague Strategic Offensive respectively. Including notable events at the closing stages of the war, such as the Meeting on the Elbe with US forces, the capture of Dresden and liberation of the infamous Theresienstadt concentration camp in the then Czechoslovakia.
To enable other features to be completed on this website, the later Divisional history will be appended in due course. Thank You.
The history of the Division is an on going project and involves continuing research or updating as necessary. Currently, the period from mid 1944 to the end of the war is awaiting compilation, which will cover the remaining campaigns the Division participated in, namely the Lvov–Sandomierz Offensive, Vistula–Oder Offensive, Berlin Strategic Offensive & , Prague Strategic Offensive respectively. Including notable events at the closing stages of the war, such as the Meeting on the Elbe with US forces, the capture of Dresden and liberation of the infamous Theresienstadt concentration camp in the then Czechoslovakia.
To enable other features to be completed on this website, the later Divisional history will be appended in due course. Thank You.